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This thesis argues for artefactualism about works of art, which is the claim that 
works of art are artefacts. It does this by considering the cases of works of music, 
and works of fiction, and arguing that each of these are artefacts, or existent, 
created, individual entities. To do this, it argues against anti-realist, eternalist, 
and type theories in these domains. The thesis draws on arguments made by 
philosophers such as Amie Thomasson regarding fictional characters and Guy 
Rohrbaugh regarding repeatable works of art.
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This thesis will argue for the artefactual theory of artworks, according to which 
works of art are artefacts. Artefacts are contingently existing objects created by 
particular intentional acts. The claim that artworks are artefacts may not seem to 
be a surprising claim. Paintings and sculptures, for instance, clearly seem to be 
man-made physical objects, so no argument should be necessary in support of the 
claim that they are artefacts.1
 
 Nonetheless, there are some works of art that are 
not so obviously artefacts. Works of music and fiction fall into this category. To 
see why, consider one popular argument against this view.   
1. Works of music and fiction are not identifiable with any particular 
physical object.   
2. Therefore, works of music and fiction are abstract objects.  (From 1) 
3. Artefacts are, by definition, created. 
4. Abstract objects are impossible to create.   
5. Therefore, works of music and fiction are not artefacts. 
 
My thesis will demonstrate why this argument is not sound. In particular I will 
show that the final premise of the argument is flawed. Abstract objects, I 
maintain, can be and often are created. Amie Thomasson2 argues convincingly 
for this claim with respect to fictional characters,3
                                                 
1 But see Gregory Currie, An Ontology of Art (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989) for an 
opposing view. Here, Currie argues for an action-type view of paintings. His theory, though, is a 
minority view, accepted by few philosophers. 
 and her arguments can be 
2 Amie L. Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999) 
3 To make it clear, I am not claiming that fictional characters are works of art, but that they have 
relevant similarities to them. 
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adapted to cover works of music and of fiction. As a consequence, the second 
chapter of the thesis will closely examine Thomasson’s arguments so they might 
be extended to cover works of music and fiction in chapters three and four.  
 
Of course, demonstrating that one argument against artefactualism is unsound 
does not by itself give a reason to think that artefactualism is true. So, chapters 
two, three, and four also attempt to motivate the view that artefactualism is true 
of the respective domains. Even if it is successfully shown (as I attempt in 
chapters three and four) that works of music and of fiction are artefacts, this is 
not sufficient to demonstrate that all works of art are artefacts. Going through all 
works of art, case by case, to provide such demonstrations is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. By picking what I consider to be two of the more controversial cases, 
though, I hope to have advanced the case significantly.  
 
There are three important aspects of an artefactual theory which distinguishes it 
from other metaphysical theories: artefacts exist; they are created; and they are 
individuals. These aspects can each be discussed in relation to fictional objects 
and works of art.  
 
First, artefacts exist. There are such things as works of art, and as fictional 
characters. That artefacts exist is presumably implied by the other claims I will 
make about artefacts, but is worth presenting separately. In the case of paintings 
an existence claim is entirely uncontroversial: no-one except the most extreme 
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global anti-realist seriously suggests that the Mona Lisa does not exist.4 It seems 
to be a concrete object that we can see if we are appropriately positioned. Works 
of music and novels are also intuitively held to exist. Regardless of whether we 
have any clear idea of what Beethoven’s symphonies, or War and Peace, are, it 
would be rather surprising to be told that they do not exist. Fictional characters 
present a different case. We generally have a strong intuition that Sherlock 
Holmes does not exist, and the artefactualist must explain this away. To do this it 
will be shown (following Peter van Inwagen)5 how our ordinary beliefs about 
fictional characters do ontologically commit us to them. For instance, the 
sentence ‘Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character’ is unhesitatingly taken to be 
true by most of us, and this sentence entails that something (namely, Sherlock 
Holmes) is a fictional character. If there is something (some fictional character) 
identical to Sherlock Holmes, then Sherlock Holmes exists. It will also be 
suggested how non-existence statements about fictional characters may be 
paraphrased away, and, even if these paraphrases do not ultimately succeed, how 
no other theory can adequately deal with non-existence statements either. 
Showing that fictional characters do exist will also require responding to pretense 
theory6 and prefix fictionalism7
 
 about fictional characters. 
Second, artefacts are created. Artists, authors, and composers create paintings, 
fictional characters, and symphonies. Jerrold Levinson describes this as ‘one of 
                                                 
4 See Stuart Brock and Edwin Mares, Realism and Anti-Realism (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007), 
chapters 4-6, for a discussion of global anti-realist positions 
5 Peter van Inwagen, ‘Creatures of Fiction’, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 4, 
October 1977, pp. 299-308 
6 Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990) 
7 Stuart Brock, ‘Fictionalism about Fictional Characters’, Nous, vol. 36, no. 1, 2002, pp. 1-21 
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the most firmly entrenched of our beliefs concerning art.’8 We do intuitively 
think that works of art are created by artists. It is again seemingly philosophically 
uncontroversial that paintings are created. The Mona Lisa did not exist before da 
Vinci put paint on a canvas, and did exist when he had completed the painting. 
He thus brought the Mona Lisa into existence, which is to say that he created it.9 
However, philosophers have tended to be less certain about the creation of music 
and fiction. The reason for this is the commonly-held belief that fictions and 
works of music are abstract objects. Abstract objects are objects which do not 
have both a spatial and a temporal location.10 Abstracta are generally regarded to 
be necessary existents which are causally unconnected to us, and are therefore 
unable to be created. Platonist theories of abstract works of art do all seek to 
account for our belief that they are created. They most commonly make recourse 
to a creative discovery account, in which the work is literally discovered 
somewhere in logical space, and the artist is correctly held to be creative for 
doing so. To argue for the claim that fictional characters and works of art are 
created, two things will be done. The first is to show that any objects which are 
not created are not the right kinds of thing to be fictional characters and to 
motivate creationism by explaining the role of creation in the correct 
individuation of fictional characters and works of music or fiction. The second is 
to give an account of how it is that these abstract objects can be created. This 
account will draw heavily on the ideas of Stephen Schiffer11
                                                 
8 Jerrold Levinson, ‘What a Musical Work Is’, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 77, no. 1, January 
1980, p. 8 
 on the importance 
9 Whether creation means (or even merely implies) ‘bringing into existence’ is questioned by 
Harry Deutsch in Harry Deutsch, ‘The Creation Problem’, Topoi, vol. 10, no. 2, September 1991, 
pp. 209-225  
10 This is David Lewis’ Way of Negation. David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 83-84 
11 Stephen Schiffer, ‘Language-Created Language-Independent Entities’, Philosophical Topics, 
vol. 24, no. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 149-167 
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of our social practices in the creation of fictional characters. Though this creation 
does begin with the author’s writing of a text featuring that character, it requires 
more than this. In particular, this account of the creation of works of art relies on 
there being a practice of acting in a certain way, and being prepared to make 
certain statements and hold certain beliefs about works of art. The account of 
creation defended here will differ from Jerrold Levinson’s modified Platonist 
account of creation as ‘indication’.12
 
 Levinson’s account of creation is very 
similar to the creative discovery account, though he argues that his account 
allows for literal creation. 
Third, artefacts are individuals. Works of art and fictional characters are not 
types, or kinds, or properties. They cannot be predicated of any particular, and 
they are not instantiable. Again, it seems intuitively obvious that this should 
apply to paintings. A painting just seems to be a particular individual object. 
Because paintings are concrete, it seems very difficult to see how they could 
plausibly be identified with types or universals, or indeed anything that admits of 
instantiation. The Mona Lisa is not instantiated by the physical object hanging in 
a gallery: it is that object. However, it has commonly thought that repeatable 
works of art (fictions, works of music, and so forth) must be types, in order to 
account for their repeatability. The relationship between a novel and any 
particular copy of that novel is thought to be a type/token relation, or a 
universal/particular relation. To the artefactualist this is not so. A work of music 
or indeed a fictional character is a particular entity as much as a painting is, 
though an abstract one. Works of art have properties that types cannot have. The 
                                                 
12 Levinson, ‘What a Musical Work Is’ 
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most important of these is modal flexibility: a fiction or a work of music could 
have been different in various ways. An author could have written the very same 
novel, but with different words, and a composer could have composed the very 
same work, but with different notes. As Guy Rohrbaugh notes, ‘a substantial 
fragment of critical talk presumes the meaningfulness of sentences like, 
‘Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon would have been better had it lacked 
certain stylistic inconsistencies’, which, on its face, concerns a certain possibility 
for this very painting.’13 We can make analogous remarks about works of music, 
such as ‘Bruckner’s Ninth Symphony might have been finished had he lived 
longer’.14 Rohrbaugh also claims that works of art are temporally flexible, or can 
change over time.15
                                                 
13 Rohrbaugh, ‘Artworks as Historical Individuals’, European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 11, no. 
2, August 2003, p. 183 
 For instance, the paint on a painting can fade, or the negative 
of a photograph can be damaged. However, it is much more difficult to see how 
novels and symphonies can be held to change over time, at least in terms of the 
properties relevant to their appreciation. Even if they cannot, the modal 
flexibility of works of art does enough work to show that works of art cannot be 
identical to types. If works of art are modally flexible in this way, we require a 
means for individuating these objects quite different from that used for 
individuating types. Type theorists individuate works of art solely by the 
conditions that any individual object must meet in order to be a token of the type. 
In other words, the only thing that can be taken into account on a type theory is 
the form or structure of the work of art. The artefactualist does not individuate on 
the basis of structure, but on the basis of the historical circumstances of the 
14 ibid., p. 182 
15 ibid., p. 186 
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work’s creation. This is in fact a highly intuitive way to individuate works, and 
the inability of type theories to do this should be seen as a mark against them. 
 
Other philosophers have argued for an artefactual theory, but few if any have 
sought to draw extended analogies between fictional characters and the different 
arts to illuminate the theory. The most prominent defender of the view is Amie 
Thomasson.16 She focuses particularly on the case of fictional characters, which 
is a reason for the focus put on them in this thesis. However, she also believes 
that artefactualism is the correct view for all of the ontology of art,17 and 
arguments strikingly similar to those given for (and against) Thomasson’s view 
of fictional characters appear in the literature on the ontology of music. 
Rohrbaugh18
 
 defends a similar view to Thomasson’s, which he takes to be 
applicable to all repeatable works of art. This thesis will develop the account of 
artefactualism about art in more detail than Thomasson and Rohrbaugh. Treating 
fictional characters as importantly analogous to works of art will enable clear 
connections to be drawn between the literatures on the metaphysics of the objects 
in these different domains.  
Both Thomasson and Rohrbaugh argue that when doing ontology of art we 
should take careful consideration of the ordinary practices of both the general 
public and of critics.19
                                                 
16 Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics 
 According to these practices, works of art are created 
individual entities, so philosophical theories have a prima facie reason to treat 
17 ibid,, pp. 129-130; Amie L. Thomasson, ‘The Ontology of Art’ in Peter Kivy (ed), The 
Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 88-90 
18 Rohrbaugh, ‘Artworks as Historical Individuals’ 
19 See Amie L. Thomasson, ‘Fictional Characters and Literary Practices’, British Journal of 
Aesthetics, vol. 43, no. 2, April 2003, especially pp. 143-147, and Rohrbaugh, ‘Artworks as 
Historical Individuals’, pp. 178-179 
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them as such too. Artefactualists reject revisionary ontologies of art. They claim 
that our artistic practices are the best evidence that we have about the 
metaphysics of art works, because to say otherwise would be to say that our 
ordinary interpretive practices are radically false. It is extremely unlikely that this 
should be so. Theorising about the ontology of art should meet David Davies’ 
‘pragmatic constraint’:  ‘Artworks must be entities that can bear the sorts of 
properties rightly ascribed to what are termed ‘works’ in our reflective critical 
and appreciative practice; that are individuated in the way such ‘works’ are or 
would be individuated, and that have the modal properties that are reasonably 
ascribed to ‘works’, in that practice.’20
 
 The ontology of art should be beholden to 
our critical practices concerning art, and artefactualism is the theory that best 
coheres with these. 
The thesis will proceed by motivating and defending artefactualism in the 
domains mentioned above. There are differences of detail between the cases. Our 
intuitions regarding fictional characters are rather different from our intuitions 
regarding works of music. Most obviously, we are often willing to deny that a 
fictional character exists, but are not willing to say so of a symphony or a work 
of fiction. It also seems that fictional characters do not properly count as works 
of art. For instance, on Levinson’s intentional-historical definition of art, a work 
of art is something which is or was intended to be regarded in the same way as 
some prior work of art was intended to be regarded.21
                                                 
20 David Davies, Art as Performance (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), p. 18. See also David 
Davies, ‘The Primacy of Practice in the Ontology of Art’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, vol. 67, no. 2, Spring 2009, pp. 159-165 
 It is at least not obvious 
that fictional characters have historically been regarded as works of art, and thus 
21 Jerrold Levinson, ‘The Irreducible Historicality of the Concept of Art’, British Journal of 
Aesthetics, vol. 42, no. 4, Oct. 2002, p. 367 
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that they should be regarded as works of art now. However, there are important 
similarities between fictional characters and works of art. It is frequently 
observed in the literature that fictional characters and other things like works of 
fiction fit into the same ontological category.22 Van Inwagen writes that creatures 
of fiction (among which are included fictional characters) are part of a ‘broader 
category of things I shall call theoretical entities of literary criticism, a category 
that also includes plots, sub-plots, novels (as opposed to tangible copies of 
novels), poems, meters, rhyme schemes, borrowings, influences, digressions, 
episodes, recurrent patterns of imagery, and literary forms ("the novel," "the 
sonnet").’23
 
  Of these, at least novels and poems can be properly considered to be 
works of art. Moreover, fictional characters, while not necessarily works of art in 
themselves, do seem to be an artistic achievement on the author’s part 
(particularly complex characters like Hamlet or Anna Karenina). The existence 
of such significant parallels between fictional characters and other works of art 
does suggest that there are relevant similarities between the two cases. Given 
both this and the extensive literature on the metaphysical status of fictional 
characters, and this literature’s similarity to other discussions in the ontology of 
art, the use of fictional characters as a case study in chapter two is justified. The 
differences in detail between the cases of fictional characters on the one hand and 
works of music and works of fiction on the other hand do not take away from the 
important similarities between the cases. All are artefacts, and all have the 
relevant properties to make them artefacts.  
                                                 
22 For instance Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics, pp. 139-143 
23 van Inwagen, ‘Creatures of Fiction’, pp. 302-303 
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The second chapter of this thesis will discuss fictional characters. The third will 
discuss works of music. The fourth will discuss works of fiction. Each chapter 
will have three sections, to argue for the claims that these objects are existent, 




























Fictional characters, such as Sherlock Holmes, exist. They are parts of the actual 
world. This is a seemingly counter-intuitive claim. It might be thought that 
saying that something is a fictional character is simply saying that it does not 
exist (at least, someone who accepts the truth of ‘Sherlock Holmes is a fictional 
character’ will frequently be prepared to deny the truth of ‘Sherlock Holmes 
exists’).  
 
In discussing this issue it will be useful to distinguish between different kinds of 
statements that can be made about fictional characters.24
(1) Sherlock Holmes is a detective. 
 First, there are 
statements about the content of a fiction, such as  
 
These can be known as fictional statements, and are true (if they are true) by 
virtue of the content of a fiction. For a fictional statement to be true, it seems as 
if fictional characters must exist. For instance, (1) seems to say, of Sherlock 
Holmes, that he is a detective, and this can only be so if Sherlock Holmes exists. 
However, there is an easy way to paraphrase fictional statements so as to avoid 
any commitment to fictional characters. This is to treat them as implicitly 
prefixed by ‘According to the (relevant) story …’. Thus, (1) is a shorthand way 
of saying 
                                                 
24 Brock, ‘Fictionalism about Fictional Characters’, pp. 4-5 
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(2) According to the Conan Doyle stories, Sherlock Holmes is a detective. 
 
This does not (at least, not clearly) create any ontological commitment to 
Sherlock Holmes, and thus provides a way for anti-realists25
(3) Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character. 
 to deal with the 
apparent truth of fictional statements. However, there are other statements about 
fictional characters that are not so easily dealt with: 
(4) Holmes is admired by many members of the British Police Force.26





These are critical statements. They cannot be paraphrased in the same way as 
fictional statements, because they are not statements that are true according to the 
story. For instance, if the ‘According to the story’ prefix was added to (3), we 
would get 
(3a) According to the Conan Doyle stories, Sherlock Holmes is a fictional 
character. 
 
(3a) is clearly false. According to the stories, Sherlock Holmes is not a fictional 
character but a human being. In fact, it is clear that in making a statement like (3) 
we are stepping outside of the story, as it were, to talk about Sherlock Holmes 
from a real-world perspective. 
 
                                                 
25 And artefactualists, as it happens. 
26 Brock and Mares, Realism and Anti-Realism, p. 201 
27 David Lewis, ‘Truth in Fiction’, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 1, January 
1978, p. 38 
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Peter van Inwagen argues that the practices of literary criticism provide us with a 
reason to postulate fictional objects. In particular, he believes that we can make 
legitimate inferences from sentences that ostensibly quantify over fictional 
characters. From the statement ‘There is a fictional character who, for every 
novel, either appears in that novel or is a model for a character who does.’ we 
can correctly infer that ‘If no character appears in every novel, then some 
character is modelled on another character.’28 Though the first of these sentences 
is presumably false, the logical structure of the inference is still correct, and the 
translation of the sentences into quantifier-variable idiom allows the further 
inference that there is a fictional character. A sentence that is true which allows 
for a similar inference is: ‘In some novels, there are important characters who are 
not introduced by the author till more than halfway through the work’.29 Van 
Inwagen makes two claims about possible paraphrases of such sentences. The 
first is that it is difficult to see how many of the more plausible paraphrases can 
succeed in allowing us to account for the logical consequences of the original 
sentences.30 The second is a concern about systematicity: ‘such paraphrases 
would be long and messy if they could be got at all; and maybe they couldn’t be 
got … So why embark on such an enterprise?’31
 
 Postulating fictional characters 
provides a smoother and more uniform way of making sense of critical 
discussions of fiction. 
                                                 
28 Peter van Inwagen, ‘Existence, Ontological Commitment, and Fictional Entities’ in Michael J. 
Loux and Dean W Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 136 
29 ibid., p. 138 
30 van Inwagen, ‘Creatures of Fiction’, pp. 303-304 





 has argued against van Inwagen. He claims that van 
Inwagen’s argument for the existence of fictional characters relies on taking the 
claims of literary criticism at face value, and that it is illegitimate to do so. His 
first gloss on van Inwagen’s argument is as follows: 
(A)  It is a truth of literary criticism that Ф. 
(B)  That Ф implies that α exists 
So, (C) α exists.33
 
 
This argument, as Yagisawa notes, is clearly invalid. However, it is not what van 
Inwagen had in mind, because he urges that the sentences of literary criticism be 
taken at face value. Instead of (A), therefore, van Inwagen would best be read as 
meaning 
 
 (A´) (It is true that) Ф.34
 
 
(C) follows from (A´) and (B), and Yagisawa calls this ‘the strongest 
reconstruction of van Inwagen’s argument [he] can think of that is faithful to his 
text’.35 He then objects to (A´), on the basis that literary criticism should not be 
taken at face value. Yagisawa claims that van Inwagen’s argument rests on a 
false assumption: that literary criticism aims at discovering truths about the 
world.36
                                                 
32 Takashi Yagisawa, ‘Against Creationism in Fiction’, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 15, 2001, 
pp. 160-167 
 Instead, Yagisawa argues that literary criticism ‘is not a discipline or 






activity aimed at propositional truth at all. Instead it is an activity aimed at 
practical results’, namely, helping us to appreciate literary works.37 Because of 
this, he argues that we have no reason to treat any sentences indigenous to 
literary criticism as literally true, and thus have no reason to suppose that the 
entities that they apparently quantify over exist. However, as Jeffrey Goodman 
has argued, these facts about literary criticism do not imply the conclusion that 
Yagisawa draws. Even if literary criticism is not as useful for finding out about 
the world as, say, physics, and even if the primary purpose of literary criticism is 
not to assert truths, it can still be the case that some critical statements about 
fictional characters are literally true.38 This also points to how Yagisawa’s 
reconstruction of van Inwagen’s argument is inaccurate. Yagisawa claims that 
van Inwagen is committed to the view that all of the sentences of literary 
criticism are true, and thus thinks that all that is required to reject van Inwagen’s 
view is to show that some of them are not. However, van Inwagen is not 
committed to this. All that is required for van Inwagen’s argument for the 
existence of fictional characters to succeed is that some of the sentences of 
literary criticism are literally true. Sentences like (3) seem to be good examples 
of these. Any sentence that describes the properties that a fictional character has, 
as opposed to the properties they are ascribed in the story, will succeed in 
providing van Inwagen with an appropriate example.39
 
 As there are such 
sentences, and many of them are true, Yagisawa’s response to van Inwagen does 
not succeed. 
                                                 
37 ibid., p. 164 
38 Jeffrey Goodman, ‘A Defense of Creationism in Fiction’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, vol. 
67, 2004, pp. 140-141 
39 ibid., pp. 136-137 
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However, there is another set of statements which are part of our pretheoretical 
beliefs about fictional characters, which might be called singular non-existence 
statements: 
(6) Sherlock Holmes does not exist. 
 
This statement cannot be held by the artefactualist to be true. If there are fictional 
characters, then fictional characters exist. (6) cannot, however, be paraphrased 
away by prefixing ‘According to the fiction’. Another analysis of the sentence is 
required. The most frequent way for realists about fictional characters to deal 
with sentences like (6) is to claim that there is an implicit restriction on 
quantification.40 Implicit restrictions on quantification are not uncommon in 
ordinary speech. In David Lewis’ example, we can look in the fridge and say that 
there is no beer without thereby denying that there is beer outside the fridge.41
(6a) There is no such person as Sherlock Holmes. 
 In 
the case of Sherlock Holmes, we are restricting our quantification to the domain 
of real people, which the artefactualist accepts does not contain Sherlock Holmes. 
The most plausible paraphrase of (6) is thus  
 
This is, according to the artefactualist, true, because Sherlock Holmes is not a 
person, but a fictional character. Of course, not all fictional characters are people, 
but the analysis can easily be modified to account for this (for instance, ‘There is 
no such concrete object as fictional character x.’, or, ‘There is no such causally 
efficacious object as fictional character x.’, or, ‘There is no object that has all of 
the properties that fictional character x holds.’) Kendall Walton has objected that 
                                                 
40 Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics, p. 112 
41 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, pp. 136-137 
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sentences of the form ‘x does not exist’ do not seem to permit of any ambiguity 
in the way that realists about fictional characters argue that (6) does.42 Statements 
of the form ‘There is no x’ may permit of an implicit restriction on quantification, 
but Walton claims that non-existence statements do not. He suggests that ‘the use 
of “exists” prevents the quantification from having a contextually determined 
domain restriction’, and thus that the realist account of (6) fails to capture the 
sentence’s meaning.43
 
 Anyone who believes that there is a difference between 
being and existence will not find this such a problem, but the artefactualist claims 
that everything that is exists. The response that this kind of realist has to make, 
then, is simply to reaffirm (6a) and analogous paraphrases as the appropriate way 
of understanding non-existence statements regarding fictional characters. A 
further point to note is that even if Walton is correct, there is still the problem 
(for realist and anti-realist views) of making sense of any negative existential 
statement. The artefactual theory is thus not significantly worse off in this regard. 
Anti-realists about fictional characters can take singular non-existence sentences 
about fictional characters as straightforwardly true. However, they must 
paraphrase away both fictional and critical claims. The most popular variety of 
anti-realism about fictional characters which attempts to do this is the pretense 
theory put forward by Kendall Walton.44
                                                 
42 Kendall L. Walton, ‘Restricted Quantification, Negative Existentials, and Fiction’, Dialectica, 
vol. 57, no. 2, 2003, pp. 239-242 
 Pretense theory is a form of 
fictionalism, according to which sentences purporting to refer to fictional 
characters do not express propositions at all, but can be used to assert real-world 
43 ibid., p. 241 
44 Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe  
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truths.45 Walton’s theory of the metaphysics of fiction comes from his overall 
theory of how fiction works. He claims that make-believe is the key notion. 
Other theories of fiction frequently begin by noting that we often make 
apparently true statements which refer to fictional characters.46 Walton thinks 
that this is mistaken, and we should start with the acts of pretense, or the games 
of make-believe that we participate in when we read works of fiction.47 A work 
of fiction is a prop in a game of make-believe, that is, an object which constrains 
the make-believe and makes some pretenses appropriate.48 Sentences that 
ostensibly feature the names of fictional characters can be paraphrased into 
sentences that describe the content of a game of make-believe. However, these 
paraphrases need not capture the meanings of the original sentences, but only 
what is being asserted in the utterance of the sentences.49 This move also allows 
Walton to avoid the systematicity requirement for paraphrases suggested by Peter 
van Inwagen. Walton claims that it would be question-begging to suppose that 
what people assert in uttering a sentence purporting to refer to a fictional 
character has the logical structure of the sentence itself, so paraphrases should 
not be obliged to display this logical form.50
                                                 
45 ibid., p. 396 
 It is easy to understand how 
assertions about the content of a fiction could be understood as make-believe. 
When we say ‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective’, Walton claims that we are not 
making an assertion, but are pretending to make an assertion. Statements that are 
made as part of a pretense can give information about the real world, however. 
The statement ‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective’ can be paraphrased in a way that 
46 ibid., p. 391 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid. pp. 37-38 
49 ibid., p. 417 
50 ibid., pp. 417-419 
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shows what this information is. The paraphrase would be something like: ‘The 
Conan Doyle stories are such that one who engages in pretense of kind K (that is, 
pretense that Sherlock Holmes is a detective) in a game authorised for them 
makes it fictional of himself in that game that he speaks truly’.51 This is an 
untidy paraphrase of a seemingly simple sentence, but it is able to be 
systematised, and the claim that fictional assertions involve pretense is intuitively 
plausible. However, it is not so obvious that ‘Sherlock Holmes is a fictional 
character’ is part of a systematic pretense. To support his theory, Walton has to 
claim that ‘Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character’ is true as part of a ‘more or 
less ad hoc or unofficial’ game of make-believe, in which there are two kinds of 
people, namely real people and fictional characters.52 In such a game, to say 
‘Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character’ is fictionally to speak truly. This is an 
awkward way to make sense of a seemingly true statement. It is highly doubtful 
that we are ever pretending that there are different kinds of people in our critical 
discussions of fiction. Walton’s suggestion that the claim that Sherlock Holmes 
is a fictional character is part of a pretense also requires that it be possible for 
someone to be engaged in pretense without knowing that they are.53 That the 
pretense theory is committed to a thesis that implies a failure of first-person 
authority over one’s own mental states54
 
 is an uncomfortable conclusion. 
Another variety of anti-realism is the prefix fictionalism about fictional 
characters defended by Stuart Brock.55
                                                 
51 ibid., p. 400 
 Brock wants to meet van Inwagen’s 
challenge to provide a systematic paraphrase of our claims about fiction. Like the 
52 ibid., p. 423 
53 Jason Stanley, ‘Hermeneutic Fictionalism’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 25, 2001, p. 46 
54 ibid., p. 47 
55 Brock, ‘Fictionalism about Fictional Characters’ 
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artefactualist, he paraphrases fictional statements by adding the prefix 
‘According to the fiction’.56 Unlike realists, he treats singular non-existence 
statements about fictional characters as straightforwardly true. He puts forward a 
novel treatment of critical statements, however. His proposal is ‘parasitic’ on the 
realist’s account of critical statements.57 The realist takes critical statements as 
straightforwardly true, but Brock argues that they can be paraphrased by adding 
the prefix ‘According to the realist’s hypothesis’.58 This is a way of allowing us 
to continue having our critical talk about fictional characters without incurring 
any ontological commitment to them. Though the fictionalist view does not 
imply that realism about fictional characters is false, it is reasonable to treat it as 
an anti-realism (or at least a live option for the anti-realist). An objection to this 
view comes from Walton.59 He argues that the fictionalist cannot provide an 
adequate and meaning-preserving paraphrase of critical claims. This is because 
the meaning of a declarative sentence, such as the fictionalist’s paraphrase of a 
critical claim, is generally taken to be determined compositionally. For a 
sentence to have a meaning, then, every part of it must have a meaning. However, 
according to Millianism, the meaning of a name is its referent. Because most 
fictionalists will believe that fictional names do not have referents, their 
paraphrases of critical claims cannot preserve the meanings of these claims. The 
prefix fictionalist has a number of options open to respond to this. They can deny 
that the meaning of a sentence is determined compositionally, or deny Millianism, 
or deny that a term with no referent makes a sentence meaningless.60
                                                 
56 ibid., p. 5 
 Perhaps a 
more serious problem for the prefix fictionalist is that they have given us no 
57 ibid., p. 9 
58 ibid. 
59 Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, p. 391ff 
60 Brock and Mares, Realism and Anti-Realism, p. 217 
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reason to think that our ordinary critical claims about fictional characters are 
elliptical for their paraphrases. It is implausible to think that when we utter (3) 
(Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character), we are in fact best understood as 
making a claim about a particular philosophical theory about the ontological 
status of fictional characters. Until the fictionalist can find a reason not to take (3) 





Among realists about fictional characters, fictional characters are generally 
thought to be abstract objects. There is clearly no concrete actual person who 
corresponds to Conan Doyle’s descriptions of Sherlock Holmes, and Kripke has 
given an argument that shows that even if there were, this person would not be 
Sherlock Holmes. Kripke writes that ‘[s]everal distinct possible people, and even 
actual ones such as Darwin or Jack the Ripper, might have performed the 
exploits of Holmes, but there is none of whom we can say he would have been 
Holmes had he performed these exploits. For if so, which one?’61
                                                 
61 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 158 
 There seem to 
be a vast number of possible people who have all of the properties that Sherlock 
Holmes is ascribed in the stories, and it is entirely arbitrary to choose one of 
them as ‘the’ Sherlock Holmes instead of any other. It cannot be the case, either, 
that all of them are Sherlock Holmes. We have the intuition that Darwin and Jack 
the Ripper are different people, and would continue to be so regardless of how 
similar they each became to Holmes. The problem of providing secure identity 
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conditions is thus a reason to think that fictional characters cannot be concrete 
objects. Another reason to think this is that concrete objects have spatiotemporal 
locations, and abstracta do not. Fictional characters do not seem to have 
spatiotemporal locations. They are not located at the places ascribed to them in 
their books: there was not a 221B Baker Street at the time in which the Holmes 
stories were set. Meinongians such as Terence Parsons will deny this.62 Parsons 
claims that fictional characters are concrete objects which are located exactly 
where stories about them say that they are.63 The reason that we cannot find 
Sherlock Holmes in London is that Sherlock Holmes does not exist. This view is 
implausible not only because it relies on a distinction between being and 
existence, but because it implies that two distinct objects can occupy the same 
spatiotemporal region. Fictional characters are also not located wherever stories 
about them are located. Works of fiction are themselves abstract objects, and thus 
have no spatiotemporal locations.64 Token copies of a story contain token 
descriptions of fictional characters, but the existence of a concrete description of 
an entity in a particular place does not imply that the entity is at that place as 
well.65 For instance, a token description of a real person in a work of non-fiction 
does not imply that the person is located where the description is (and no-one 
would take it to do so). There are no other plausible options for a concrete realist 
to use to tell us where fictional characters are.66
                                                 
62 Terence Parsons, Nonexistent  Objects (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), 
pp. 49-60 
 If there are fictional characters, 
then, they are abstract.  
63 ibid., p. 55 
64 See chapter four for further discussion of this. 
65 Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics, p. 37 
66 Though Jeffrey Goodman, an abstract realist about fictional characters, thinks they do have a 
spatial location: roughly, Earth. See Jeffrey Goodman, ‘Where is Sherlock Holmes?’, Southern 




Philosophers have frequently believed that abstract objects cannot have any 
causal connection with us. Because of this, creationism about fictional characters 
has been seen as an unintuitive view. There are, however, good reasons to accept 
it. One of these is that we accept the truth of sentences such as  
(7) Sherlock Holmes was created by Arthur Conan Doyle. 
 
As Amie Thomasson notes, our acceptance of the created status of fictional 
characters can help us make sense of some of our modal claims about fiction. For 
instance, ‘we count our good luck that certain characters like Sherlock Holmes 
were created when, given a busier medical practice, Arthur Conan Doyle might 
never have created him’.67 It does not make sense to do this if Holmes is not 
literally created. An even clearer example that Thomasson uses is this: ‘If 
someone contended that George Washington was a great fan of Sherlock Holmes, 
we might object that in Washington’s time there was no Sherlock Holmes – the 
Holmes character was not created until 1887’.68
 
 Certainly no-one, whether a 
creationist about fictional characters or not, would accept the truth of ‘George 
Washington was a great fan of Sherlock Holmes’. However, the creationist can 
show why it is literally impossible for this to be the case: Holmes cannot be 
admired until after he is created. A non-creationist realist will have to accept that 
it is logically possible, though fantastically unlikely, that Washington was, in fact, 
a fan of Holmes. This is an unacceptable consequence. 
                                                 
67 Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics, p. 6 
68 ibid., pp. 5-6 
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There is a further reason for treating fictional characters as created. Anyone who 
wants to claim that fictional characters exist requires a way to provide identity 
conditions for them, and creationism about fiction enables this to be done. 
Simply, a fictional character has the essential property of being created in the 
very act of creation in which it was. Two characters which appear in different 
stories are identical if and only if they were both created in the same act of 
creation, or are appropriately causally connected (through a causal chain of the 
kind described by Kripke)69 to the original act of creation. Thomasson calls the 
dependence of a fictional character on the circumstances of its creation a ‘rigid 
historical dependence’. Fictional characters are also dependent on human 
intentionality for their continued existence. A fictional character can go out of 
existence if no records or memories of it survive. Fictional objects thus have a 
‘generic constant dependence’ on concrete copies of the fictions in which they 
appear, and on there being competent users of the language who are capable of 
reading these fictions.70 They are generically dependent because they depend on 
there being some concrete copy and some reader, but not on any particular copy 
or any particular reader. They are constantly dependent because they exist only 
as long as there is some copy and some reader.71 It is worth noting at this point 
that Thomasson’s theory fits fictions into her ontology in the same category as 
fictional characters, that is, as dependent abstract objects. Because of this, 
Thomasson’s ontology is not qualitatively unparsimonious.72
                                                 
69 Kripke, Naming and Necessity 
 If we already 
believe in the existence of fictions, then a belief in the existence of fictional 
characters is not a belief in a different kind of entity. 
70 Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics, p. 36 
71 ibid. 
72 See David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 87, on 




In Thomasson’s theory, the appearance of a character in a particular fiction is a 
result of a deliberate and knowing act by a particular author. This is the basis of 
her conditions for identifying characters across fictions. The first condition she 
suggests is as follows: 
We can at least specify an important necessary condition C for the 
identity of characters x and y appearing in literary works K and L 
respectively: The author of L must be competently acquainted with x of 
K and intend to import x into L as y… By “competent acquaintance” I 
mean the kind of acquaintance that would enable the author to be a 




It can clearly be seen that this condition can closely be linked with the causal 
chain theory of reference developed by Kripke.74 For an author to be referring to 
a particular (and previously created) fictional character, they must have learnt the 
name from an appropriate causal chain in an appropriate way (for instance, by 
reading the book that the character first appeared in). This seems to be a sensible 
necessary condition for trans-fictional identity. It allows characters in literary 
works in the same series be identified as the same, because (for instance) Arthur 
Conan Doyle was competently acquainted with the Sherlock Holmes of A Study 
in Scarlet, as he was the author of the work, and he intended to import Sherlock 
Holmes into The Sign of the Four. It also solves a case that Thomasson discusses 
– the case of Pamela.75
                                                 
73 ibid., p. 67 
 Pamela appears in Samuel Richardson’s Pamela, and this 
book is parodied by Henry Fielding’s Joseph Andrews. Thomasson also imagines 
a Fred Jones, who by sheer coincidence and without any knowledge produces a 
74 Kripke, Naming and Necessity 
75 Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics, p. 56 
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fiction word-for-word identical to Richardson’s. Intuitively, the Pamelas of 
Richardson’s and Fielding’s works are the same, but the Pamela of Jones’s work 
is a different (though remarkably similar) character. The condition for identity 
above can make this case fit this intuition. Fielding is competently acquainted 
with the Pamela of Richardson’s work, and intends to import her into his own 
work, and Jones does not. Another way to put this is that the two characters 
originate in different acts of creation. Fielding is competently acquainted with the 
original act of creation (through having read the relevant book), and Jones is not. 
There is a causal chain leading from Richardson’s act to Fielding’s, and there is 
not one leading from Richardson’s act to Jones’s. If we accept a Kripkean view 
of reference, then we find that creationism about fictional characters allows us to 
present a viable way of identifying characters across stories. This is a major 
argument in favour of the creationist view. 
 
Creationism about fictional characters is denied by both anti-realists and 
Platonists. Anti-realists may say that creationism is trivially true, in that all the 
fictional characters there are (none of them) are created, but can also say that it is 
false to say that Sherlock Holmes was created, because ‘x was created’ implies ‘x 
exists’. 
 
The reason that Platonists about fictional characters do not believe that fictional 
characters can be created is that abstract objects cannot have causal connections 
with us. (This point also applies to David Lewis’ concrete realism.) To create an 
abstract object on a Platonist account is to bring into existence something with 
which you can have no causal connection, which is a patent absurdity. An 
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abstractum which is necessarily existing in logical space cannot be brought into 
being by any intentional action. Harry Deutsch described the conflict between 
creationism and the ordinary view of abstract objects as the ‘creation problem’. 
The creation problem can be best represented as an argument as follows: 
 
1. Fictional characters are abstract objects. 
2. Creating an object entails bringing it into existence or causing it to exist. 
3. Abstract objects cannot stand in causal relations. 
4. Therefore, fictional characters are not created. 76
 
 
Deutsch’s solution to the creation problem is a novel one. It is generally thought 
that the creation of any object implies that object’s being brought into existence. 
Indeed, this may be regarded as a fact about the concept of creation.77 Deutsch 
rejects this. He argues for this by noting that there is a plenitude of abstract 
objects, and therefore any description that an author makes of a character is 
almost certain to describe some abstract object (Deutsch does not make it clear 
whether the line is drawn at impossibility or at some other point). The other 
important aspect of the creation of fictions on Deutsch’s account is that the 
author’s word is law. It is impossible for an author to misdescribe a character he 
is authoring. The author’s activity is stipulative. Deutsch calls this the ‘principle 
of poetic license’.78
                                                 
76 Deutsch, ‘The Creation Problem’, p. 210 
 These two points taken together are supposed to show that 
literary creation is stipulation: an author creates a character by stipulating what 
the character is like. This is creation because of the principle of poetic license – 
the author’s stipulation cannot be wrong, and is attributive of the character. This 
77 Yagisawa, ‘Against Creationism in Fiction’, p. 156 
78 Deutsch, ‘The Creation Problem’, p. 211 
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is a looser sense of create than we are used to using. Deutsch in fact suggests that 
‘create’ in a literary context means something more like ‘invent in the 
imagination’ than ‘bring into existence’.79 Because of this, Deutsch’s creationism 
is quite different from the creationism of the artefactualist. It could be argued that 
Deutsch is not a creationist about fictional characters at all, but this may be 
slightly misleading, as he does believe that fictional characters are created. He is 
not attempting to propose a ‘watered-down’ sense of creation, but a different one. 
It can be argued, though, that Deutsch’s version of creation as stipulative 
selection is not any kind of creation at all. Stefano Predelli notes that ‘[a]ny 
freely chosen consistent collection of arithmetical properties, for that matter, may 
be guaranteed to correspond to a class of numbers, without it being appropriate to 
credit the selector with the power of having created that set-theoretic item’.80
 
 
Deutsch’s solution to the creation problem strays so far from our ordinary notion 
of creation that it will be better to find another solution. 
Ontological realists about fictional characters, that is, those who believe that 
there are fictional characters, typically do not base their judgement on the truth of 
statements about the content of a fiction. The statements that do cause the realist 
to commit to fictional statements are the statements that are made in our critical 
discussion of fiction. Perhaps the paradigmatic example of such a statement is: 
 
(3) Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character. 
 
Any theory of fiction is absolutely obliged to be able to make sense of this 
statement. The statement seems to imply that an individual (Sherlock Holmes) is 
                                                 
79 ibid., p. 216 
80 Stefano Predelli, ‘Musical Ontology and the Argument from Creation’, British Journal of 
Aesthetics, vol. 41, no. 3, July 2001, p. 287 
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an example of a particular kind of thing (a fictional character). To make sense of 
the statement requires some kind of notion of what this kind of thing is, and what 
other objects both do and (importantly) do no belong to it. Eternalist (non-
creationist) views of fiction must be able to delineate what are and what are not 
fictional characters in order to make sense of (3). It will be argued that they 
cannot do this. 
 
On the possibilist view (the view of David Lewis), Sherlock Holmes is a human 
being, the same kind of thing as you and me. The difference between Sherlock 
Holmes and you and me is that we are actual and he is not, which simply means 
that we are human beings in this world and he is a human being in another world. 
I am certain that I am not a fictional character, so if Sherlock Holmes is the same 
kind of thing as me, but differs only in virtue of his non-actuality, then he is not a 
fictional character either. Another thing of the same kind as Sherlock Holmes is 
Frederick Holmes, who is the unactualised possible human being named 
‘Frederick Holmes’ who does exactly the same things as Sherlock Holmes does. 
There should be some basis on which Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character, 
but I am not, and Frederick Holmes is not. The difference seems to be that in the 
actual world there are fictional stories, authored by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, 
about Sherlock Holmes, but there are no fictional stories about me (I am actual, 
after all) or about Frederick Holmes. However, this creates a further question. On 
what basis can the actual Conan Doyle stories be said to be about the non-actual 
person Sherlock Holmes? It cannot be because Sherlock Holmes is the only non-
actual person to have done what Doyle reports him as doing, because Frederick 
Holmes did those things too. In fact, there could be actual people, such as 
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Darwin or Jack the Ripper, who performed the deeds of Holmes in another 
possible world (at least, if we believe in trans-world identity). If Conan Doyle 
was just describing the adventures of some non-actual detective, he could have 
been mistaken about the details. It would be possible that the Sherlock Holmes 
stories are in fact about Frederick Holmes, and thus that Frederick Holmes is a 
fictional character and Sherlock Holmes is not. That is an unacceptable 
consequence. It also cannot be the case that every person who performs the acts 
that Sherlock Holmes is ascribed the performance of in the stories is Sherlock 
Holmes, because Darwin and Jack the Ripper would still be different people, no 
matter how similar they each became to Holmes.81
 
 Even if we take Sherlock 
Holmes to be anyone who performs the acts ascribed to Sherlock Holmes, and 
recorded as doing so  by Watson, and called ‘Sherlock Holmes’, we  clearly do 
not have a unique individual who is Sherlock Holmes. There are (at least on 
Lewis’ account) many possible individuals who fit.  
There is in fact an even more serious problem with the claim that Sherlock 
Holmes is a fictional character because of the actual Conan Doyle stories about 
him. It is simply that the Conan Doyle stories are not about him. The possible 
worlds of David Lewis are totally causally unconnected to us, and the people in 
them are also totally causally unconnected to us. In order for the actual Conan 
Doyle stories to be about the non-actual person Sherlock Holmes, there would 
have to be some causal connection between the two, or there must be some way 
for Conan Doyle to pick out Sherlock Holmes without some causal connection. 
As regards the first option, the Conan Doyle stories actually exist, and would 
                                                 
81 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 158 
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actually exist even if Sherlock Holmes did not exist in any possible world. 
Sherlock Holmes exists, but is not actual, and would have existed even if there 
were no actual stories with a character named ‘Sherlock Holmes’. The person 
Sherlock Holmes and the Conan Doyle stories are totally independent of one 
another.82
 
 For the second option, Conan Doyle cannot succeed in referring by 
description to Sherlock Holmes. This is because Sherlock Holmes is not a unique 
individual. The best that Conan Doyle can do is to refer to a set of individuals in 
different possible worlds (who are presumably counterparts of each other). If we 
are to take the Conan Doyle stories as referring to one Holmes, there is no 
principled way to decide which one. We cannot thus say of any non-actual 
Holmes that Conan Doyle was referring to him and not to somebody else. It 
therefore cannot be said that Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character because of 
(or in virtue of) the Conan Doyle stories. Individuating fictional characters from 
unactualised possibles must thus be done in some other way, and there are no 
other obvious plausible candidates. 
Now to briefly describe how I believe the argument generalises to all eternalist 
views. The basis of the view of eternalism about fictional characters is that 
fictional characters are not the kind of thing that can be created because they are 
not the kind of thing that authors can have the right kind of causal interaction 
with. If authors cannot create characters, though, on what basis can they be said 
to be writing about a particular character? Unless the character has some real 
causal properties (of which the most useful would be ‘created by such-and-such 
                                                 
82 This point is rather similar to one of the more serious objections to Lewis’ modal realism: ‘the 
problem of explaining what these [worlds] would have to do with modality if there were any of 
them.’, from Peter van Inwagen, ‘Plantinga on Trans-World Identity’, in Peter van Inwagen and 




an author in such-and-such an act of creation), the author could be mistaken, as 
above. Conan Doyle could have written slightly incorrect stories about the 
Meinongian nonexistent Frederick Holmes, or the Platonic abstractum Frederick 
Holmes, without the actual content of the stories being any different than they 
were. In each of these cases, Frederick Holmes is the same kind of thing as 
Sherlock Holmes. But Frederick Holmes is, intuitively, not a fictional character. 
On eternalist views, Sherlock Holmes thus cannot be a fictional character either. 
The theorist is left with 3 options: deny the truth of (3) (‘Sherlock Holmes is a 
fictional character’), reject realism about fictional characters, or become a 
creationist about fictional characters. My personal inclination is to accept both (3) 
and be an ontological realist, but, if it could be shown that creationism about 
fictional characters is incoherent, this argument would succeed in showing 
realism to be false. 
 
The foregoing discussion can be used to consider a problem for any creationist 
view of fiction: that of determining when a fictional character comes into 
existence. No eternally existing object can be a fictional character, and I believe 
that there are fictional characters (of which Sherlock Holmes is one). There is 
therefore a time at which Sherlock Holmes came into existence. One argument 
against the eternalist view is that an author cannot decide what an eternal object 
is like, but can decide what a character is like according to a story. However, this 
does not necessarily tell us what a character is like simpliciter.83
                                                 
83 It seems possible that, even if artefactualism is the correct theory of fictional objects, the best 
way to find out what is true according to a story may be to make-believe that Lewis’ theory is 
correct. This may even be the way for abstractists to deal with critical statements that assume that 
fictional characters have a mental life of their own, such as ‘Holmes would not have needed tapes 
to get the goods on Nixon’: it is true according to the story, in the Lewisian sense of ‘according to 
the story’. Cf. Kit Fine, ‘The Problem of Non-Existents I. Internalism’, Topoi, vol. 1, 1982, p. 98: 
 How, then, do 
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we find out? What is it that determines what Sherlock Holmes is like (such as, 
that he is a fictional character)? The answer to this is that what Sherlock Holmes 
is like is determined by our critical practices regarding fiction. This is 
appropriate, because, as discussed earlier, it is statements made in our critical 
practices that provide the best evidence for there being fictional characters. 
Conan Doyle produced stories that contained Sherlock Holmes, who according to 
the story is a human and a detective. Our critical practices regarding fiction 
determined that because of Conan Doyle’s stories, Sherlock Holmes is a fictional 
character. This means that there was such a fictional character as Sherlock 
Holmes as soon as our critical practices could be directed at Conan Doyle’s 
stories, and no sooner.84 The most reasonable time to suppose that this happened 
is when the first of the Conan Doyle stories including Sherlock Holmes was 
published. Fictional characters are created on the publication, or the making 
publicly accessible, (in communities in which our critical practices regarding 
fiction exist) of the stories of which they are characters. This owes much to the 
notion that fictional characters are created by what Stephen Schiffer calls the 
‘hypostasizing’ use of fictional names.85
 
 The hypostasizing use of a fictional 
name is the use of a fictional name in our critical practices, to discuss an actual 
fictional character, as opposed to the use of it to describe the content of a fiction.  
                                                                                                                                    
‘Finally, the internalist theory, though not correct as a theory of objects, may correctly be 
interpreted as a theory of the contents of those objects and, as such, may usefully be grafted onto 
the more satisfactory theory that is to follow.’ 
84 This appears consistent with the suggestion of Zalta that our talk about fictional characters 
should be seen as quantifying over patterns of use. There are no patterns of use of the name 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ until there are critical practices directed at Conan Doyle’s stories. See Edward 
N. Zalta, ‘The Road Between Pretense Theory and Abstract Object Theory’ in A. Everett and T. 
Hofweber (eds), Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence (Stanford: CSLI 
Publications, 2000), pp. 25-29 
85 Schiffer, ‘Language-Created Language-Independent Entities’, p. 157 
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There is an objection that could be made to this argument. If we believe that 
Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character, and that Sherlock Holmes is created, we 
are likely to believe 
 
(7) Sherlock Holmes was created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. 
 
However, if Sherlock Holmes was created on the publication of Conan Doyle’s 
stories, it seems as if Strand Magazine should get some of the credit as well. This 
is counterintuitive, and seems clearly false. However, it is not a consequence of 
this explanation of creation that publishers create characters as much as authors 
do. The publication of a work of fiction into a community in which our critical 
practices regarding fiction exist is the proximate cause of that character’s 
existing. The fictional character Sherlock Holmes began to exist when Strand 
Magazine published Conan Doyle’s stories. There are, though, further causes 
along the way to the fictional character Sherlock Holmes being brought into 
existence. Strand Magazine’s publication of the stories was presumably caused 
by various things, but the one event which is the original cause of the publication 
of the stories is Conan Doyle’s writing of them. (7) is true because Conan 
Doyle’s writing of the stories is the cause of those stories (and not other stories 
featuring a detective called Frederick Holmes) being published. If the same 
stories had first been published at a different time, or in a different place, the 
same characters would still have existed. If the author’s actions had been 
different, then different characters would have existed. Creationism is thus 
consistent with the belief that a fictional character is created by the author of the 




Another potential problem with this account of creation is related to the use of 
creationism as a means to individuate fictional characters. If we are individuating 
fictional characters by their acts of creation, then we need different acts of 
creation for different characters. However, if fictional characters are created by 
having works including them made publicly accessible, then all of the characters 
in a book will be created in the same act of creation, and will thus (on this 
account) be the same character. It is clearly not the case that any analysis of 
fiction would want to imply that Sherlock Holmes and Watson are the same 
character. This problem can be dealt with similarly to the previous one. Though 
Holmes and Watson come into existence at the same time, on the publication of 
the relevant stories, the acts of Conan Doyle that were the original cause of their 
coming into existence were different. The two can have their histories traced 
back to different starting points. This response may not be entirely satisfactory. It 
seems possible that Conan Doyle could have conceived of the detective and his 
chronicler together, and, even if he did not, it is not entirely clear how we should 
go about individuating an author’s acts of imagination. Perhaps it is in fact the 
case that Holmes and Watson become publicly accessible at different times, by 




Fictional characters are not types, or kinds, or properties, but individuals. Types 
are the kinds of things that can have tokens, and fictional characters are not. 
Properties are the kinds of things that can be predicated of individuals, and 




Part of the motivation for this view comes from the observation that fictional 
characters are created, whereas types and properties are generally thought to exist 
necessarily and eternally if they exist at all. Thinking of fictional characters as 
actual existents and not just sets of possibilia is also motivation in this direction. 
 
Those who argue that fictional characters are not individuals but types are role 
realists, such as Nicholas Wolterstorff86 and Greg Currie.87 Wolterstorff claims 
that characters are ‘person-kinds’.88 Kinds, according to Wolterstorff, are 
mapped one-to-one with properties: for every property k there is the associated 
kind K.89 Fictional characters are person-kinds (not persons of a certain kind) 
that are maximal components of the world of a work of fiction, where the world 
of a work of fiction is a certain state of affairs.90
 
 Of course not all fictional 
characters are ascribed the property of being persons at all, but Wolterstorff’s 
theory can easily account for other cases. This view implies that the properties 
that are ascribed to a character are essential to that character, because an example 
of the person-kind K could not exist without its having exactly the property k. 
Currie claims that fictional characters (at least in what he calls the ‘transfictive’ 
uses of their names, or, roughly, in critical claims about them) are roles.91
                                                 
86 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1980) 
 Within 
his possible-worlds analysis of fiction, he argues that ‘there is a (partial) function 
87 Gregory Currie, The Nature of Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
88 Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art, p. 144 
89 ibid., p. 47 
90 ibid., pp. 145-146 .Wolterstorff does argue for the conception of fictions as worlds, but that 
point is not critical to this discussion. 
91 Currie, The Nature of Fiction, pp. 171-172 
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from worlds to individuals that picks out Holmes in each world where somebody 
is Holmes, and the value of this function for a world-argument is the individual, 
if there is one, who satisfies [the definite description which Holmes satisfies]’.92 
This function is what Currie calls the Holmes role. Currie notes that this role is 
unoccupied in the actual world (which is what he takes us to mean when we say 
that Sherlock Holmes does not exist), but is occupied in other possible worlds. A 
role is an abstract, theoretical entity, so Currie’s views have some similarity to 
van Inwagen’s. For instance, according to Currie, a fictional character cannot 
have the property of being fat (a role cannot be fat), but can be ascribed the 
property in a fiction.93
 
 It is in fact not entirely clear what it would be to ascribe 
fatness to a function from worlds to individuals. Presumably it is to say that 
anyone who occupies the role must be fat, but this seems to be constitutive of the 
role in a way in which ascribed properties of fictional characters are not 
constitutive of those characters. However, this is not an argument against role 
realism, but just a possible reason why it should not be conflated with other 
realisms about fictional characters. 
There is something unusual about the claim that fictional characters are kinds or 
types. It is that these things are traditionally thought to have tokens, or to be 
realised by some individual. Fictional characters, on the other hand, cannot have 
real tokens. Even if there is a person with all of the properties ascribed to a 
certain fictional character, he is still not a token of that character.94
                                                 
92 ibid., p. 172 
 For a person 
to be that character, the relevant stories would have to be about them, and, given 
that the stories are fictional, they are not about real people at all. Fictional 
93 ibid., p. 173 
94 For the reasons given by Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. 158 
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characters are thus untokenable types, or unrealisable roles. Untokenable types 
do not seem like a helpful addition to our ontology, and do not help us to draw 
out the similarities between fictional characters and other things. 
 
Another problem with the view of fictional characters as kinds is pointed to by 
Wolterstorff. This problem is that kinds could not have been different than they 
are. The properties that an individual must have to be an example of a kind are 
essential to that kind.95 Two difficulties for the view of characters as kinds 
follow from this. The first is that, given that Wolterstorff believes that every 
property a character is ascribed is essential to it, it means that no fictional 
character could have been ascribed different properties than it is. What would 
seem to be a character being ascribed different properties would in fact, 
according to Wolterstorff, be the delineation of a different person-kind, and so a 
different character. This goes against our intuitions. It does not seem to be the 
case that, had Conan Doyle ascribed Holmes slightly different properties, he 
would have in fact created a completely different character. All he would have in 
fact done was ascribe the very same character different properties. The second 
difficulty created by the identity conditions for kinds is that of providing identity 
conditions for characters across different stories. Wolterstorff himself does note 
this problem, and attempts to provide a solution for it. He writes that ‘having 
written one book, Conan Doyle offered the further adventures of Sherlock 
Holmes. And then there is the related phenomenon of different writers telling the 
story of Hercules, of Hamlet, of Don Juan, of Faust—telling it differently.’96
                                                 
95 Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art, p. 148 
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which will seemingly ascribe the character different properties, must in fact be 
about different characters. Wolterstorff’s solution to this is to draw a ‘rough and 
ready’ distinction between properties that are more or less central within a 
character.97 The person-kind which possesses the central core of properties of the 
character is different from each of the person-kinds in the particular books. It is 
not a maximal component of any of the books, but it is a component that contains 
each of the maximal components of the different books that we would want to 
identify as the same character.98 Thomasson has argued against this account of 
identity across fictions.99 For this means of identification to work, we need to be 
able to pick out the central core of properties. However, it is not clear what they 
must be. Wolterstorff and Thomasson each discuss the example of Faust. 
Wolterstorff claims that he has the essential properties of being called Faust, 
signing a pact with the devil, and so forth.100 Thomasson notes that it seems 
possible for even these conditions to fail to be met by a character that we would 
intuitively want to say is the same Faust character. Someone could write a fiction 
according to which Faust turns down the devil’s offer, or a fiction in which 
someone called ‘Phaust’ does not.101 If, however, we want to go down to an even 
smaller central core of properties than this (maybe being a man and being 
intelligent), we will have too few properties, and will end up identifying works as 
about the same character when they are in fact clearly about different 
characters.102
                                                 
97 ibid., p. 149 
 This dilemma is a direct consequence of role realism about 
fictional characters. Because this view claims that fictional characters are kinds, 
98 ibid., p. 149 
99 Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics, pp. 58-61 
100 Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art, p. 149 




and kinds have all of the properties within them essentially, this view cannot 


























3. Works of Music 
 
The works of music that will be discussed in this chapter are works of pure 
instrumental music. Though there are obviously far more works of music than 
this (and I believe that artefactualism applies to the others too) the majority of the 
literature on the ontology of music is on works of pure instrumental music, so 




Unlike the case of fictional characters, there is not very much dispute that works 
of music exist (alternatively, that there are works of music). The philosopher who 
argues that there are works of music is not going against our intuitions. There are 
obviously true sentences that refer to works of music, and true sentences that 
quantify over works of music. An example of the first is 
(8)  In This House, On This Morning is a suite.103
  
 
An example of the second is 
(9) There are more than thirty symphonies composed by Mozart.104
 
 
Both (8) and (9) seem to be straightforwardly true and are usually taken at face 
value. This implies the existence of In This House, On This Morning and 
Mozart’s symphonies. This strategy of course generalises to other works of 
music as well.  
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There have been some philosophers who have suggested that works of music do 
not exist (or at least, if they do, they are something rather different from what we 
have thought). The views that will be discussed here are eliminativism, 
nominalism and two types of action theory, which are forms of reductionism, and 
pretense fictionalism. 
 
Ross P. Cameron has argued that the world does not contain any objects 
(concrete or abstract) with which works of music can be identified, even though 
many of the sentences we utter about works of music are literally true.105 On this 
account, (8) is true, but, as a matter of ontological fact, there is no thing which is 
In This House, On This Morning. Cameron argues that when we are making 
ontological claims, or trying to ‘describe how the world is at its fundamental 
level’, our sentences are not in English but in ‘Ontologese’, and that affirming 
the truth of (8) does not contradict saying, in Ontologese, that there is no thing 
which is In This House, On This Morning.106 Accepting this view would require 
us to accept that sentences have other than their usual meanings when they are 
used in ontological discussions, which is not an appealing idea. Another 
eliminativist about works of music is Richard Rudner, who claims that our 
ordinary locutions about works of music are shorthand for talk about 
performances.107
                                                 
105 Ross P. Cameron, ‘There Are No Things that are Musical Works’, British Journal of 
Aesthetics, vol. 48, no. 3, July 2008, p. 295 
 For instance, he writes that ‘the sentence "Beethoven's Fifth 
Symphony is good but this is a bad rendition of it," could be taken as an ellipsis 
for "there is a musical rendition called Beethoven's Fifth Symphony which is 
106 ibid., pp. 300-301 
107 Richard Rudner, ‘The Ontological Status of the Esthetic Object’, Philosophy and 
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pleasing esthetically but this musical rendition, while similar to it in important 
respects, is esthetically displeasing."’108
 
 However, it is not at all clear that the 
claim ‘there is a musical rendition called Beethoven's Fifth Symphony’ helps us 
to do away with works of music. Eliminativism about musical works is 
unsuccessful. 
Nominalists want to do away with abstracta altogether, and to identify the things 
we think are abstract objects with concrete objects of some kind. In the case of 
works of music, the most plausible concreta to do this with are performances (or 
sets thereof) and scores, or both.  
 
The most prominent nominalist about works of music was Nelson Goodman. 
Goodman believed that a work of music was ‘the class of performances 
compliant with a character’.109 By a character Goodman meant a score, which 
was a character in a notational system that was such that it may have 
compliants.110 A musical work is thus the class of all those concrete objects that 
are compliant with the score. (Goodman also believed that classes were fictions, 
so presumably musical works were too.) Compliance for Goodman is exact 
compliance, so a work of music is the class of all note-perfect performances of 
the work. Not only does a score uniquely determine a class of performances, but 
the class of performances also uniquely determines the score, which can only 
happen if each member of the class complies with the score exactly.111
                                                 
108 ibid. 
 Goodman 
claims that precise compliance such as this is the only way to preserve the 
109 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (New York: 
Bobbs- Merrill, 1968), p. 210 
110 ibid., p. 177 
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identity of the work through a chain of scores and performances, and is thus 
necessary even though it is unintuitive.  
 
Arguing against nominalism, Stephen Davies writes  
Many of the things we say about musical works are not reducible to claims 
about performances or about sets of performances. For example, consider the 
following: ‘With his Fifth, Beethoven fully entered his mature period’, or: 
‘Beethoven’s First was influenced by the symphonies of Mozart and Haydn’. 
Moreover, we group performances into sets in terms of the works they are of 
and no other principle allows us to group them as we do, so the individuation of 
performances presupposes the existence of works, not vice versa.112
 
 
There are further objections to the account of musical works as classes (or sets) 
of performances. One is that there is only one null class, which implies that all 
unperformed works are identical with each other.113 This is clearly false, as it is 
obvious that there are a number of unperformed works. 114Another problem is 
that sets have their membership essentially.115 However, works of music can 
have more, or fewer, or different performances to those they do have, and can 
thus not be identified with sets. A third problem is that it is often thought that a 
set can only exist when its members exist, so, given that different performances 
of a work occur (and therefore exist) at different times, the set of all and only the 
things that are ever performances of a particular work of music does not exist.116
                                                 
112 Stephen Davies, ‘Ontologies of Musical Works’, in his Themes in the Philosophy of Music 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 31 
 
There is no existent set that matches the set that a nominalist would like to 
113 Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art, pp. 44, 100 
114 Perhaps this problem could be avoided if we treated a work as the set of all of its 
performances and all of its scores. Any ‘work’ that does not have any performances or scores 
(‘embodiments’) presumably doesn’t exist, and, given that there are no non-existent works, this 
might get around this objection. 
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identify a musical work with. A possible response to claims such as these, given 
by Stephen Davies, is to suggest that what matters on Goodman’s account is that 
each individual performance (each member of the putative set) is ‘a complete and 
accurate expression of the work’, not that we can pick out the set.117 Mentioning 
a class is helpful because it reminds us that work-preserving performances can 
differ, but the class that really counts is the class of all performances which 
would be instances of the work, or the work’s possible extension.118
 
 The problem 
with this solution is that it cannot be faithful to Goodman, who would have been 
even more hostile to classes of possibilia than he would have been to classes 
simpliciter (though this shouldn’t stop anyone else from appropriating this view.) 
A rather different view on the metaphysical status of musical works is that of 
Gregory Currie and David Davies.119 They argue that a work of music (or any 
other work of art) is identical to the action of a composer (or artist). They differ 
in that Currie thinks that the work is an action-type of which the composer’s 
particular act is a token, whereas Davies thinks it is an action-token. Every other 
view on the ontology of music supposes that if there are any musical works, they 
will be objects in their own right. However, according to Currie and Davies, the 
object that would generally be held to be the work is instead the ‘work-focus’. 
According to Davies, works of art ‘belong to the class of performances whereby 
a content is articulated through a vehicle on the basis of shared 
understandings’.120
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 The major reason for holding the view that works of art are 
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performances is that when we appreciate artworks we are appreciating a certain 
kind of achievement of the artist.121
 
 Our recognising what a composer has done 
and ascribing the appropriate properties to the work requires, according to Davies 
and Currie, that we treat works as actions. The main problem with this view is 
that it is not at all plausible that a work of music could be identified with a 
compositional action. For instance, the view implies that we cannot hear a work 
of music unless we have heard the composer composing it, or that the work 
ceases to exist (though the work-focus remains) once the work has been 
completed. I will thus not be focusing on Davies’ and Currie’s views. 
A fictionalist about musical works is Andrew Kania.122 He is led to this view by 
a focus on how we should study the ontology of music. He argues that 
ontologists of music should be descriptivist. Descriptivists treat the ordinary 
discussions of art by artists and critics as the best evidence we have for doing 
ontology of art. As Rohrbaugh puts it (and with which Kania agrees), 
‘[o]ntologies of art are beholden to our artistic practices’.123
we may be justified in thinking that our ontological theories of art (as with our 
theories of everything else) must obey the laws of logic, but if they are truly 
descriptive they are not beholden to anything else, apart from our artistic 
practice, in ways already discussed. If the best rational reconstruction of the 
 This constraint rules 
out views according to which works of art are things much different from what 
we think they are. It could also be used to rule technical metaphysical discussions 
out of the ontology of art. Kania writes: 
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ontological conception of artworks implicit in artistic practice is that they are X, 
Y, and Z, then artworks are in fact the kind of thing that is X, Y, and Z.124
 
 
It seems strange that, given this (sensible) discussion of what it is that ontologists 
of art should be finding out, Kania goes on to defend fictionalism. The 
fictionalism that Kania defends is pretense fictionalism, according to which 
statements about musical works are to be understood in the spirit of a pretense. 
Kania claims that works of music are ‘intentional inexistents’.125 To say that 
works of music are intentional inexistents is to say that ‘(i) there are no such 
things, either outside the mind in the concrete or abstract realms, or inside the 
mind, but that (ii) there is a quite robust shared system of representations of such 
things.’126 Kania suggests that the ongoing and seemingly intractable disputes 
that metaphysicians have had about the ontological status of musical works may 
be evidence that there are not any,127
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 but this is hardly conclusive. By parity of 
reasoning, we could discover that, say, causation does not exist either. Maybe 
this is correct, but it does not seem as if the inability of philosophers to agree on 
a single answer to the question of its nature should be part of the evidence. Kania 
also draws an analogy between music and language (which is argued by Georges 
Rey, who Kania cites, to be an intentional inexistent). He claims (though without 
great confidence) that ‘the ways musical ideas are disseminated through works is 
analogous to the way ideas are disseminated through language: they are set down 
in writing, and communicated through ‘utterances’ (performances), none of 
125 Georges Rey, ‘The Intentional Inexistence of Language — But Not Cars’, in Robert Stainton 
(ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 237 – 255, in 
Kania, ‘The Methodology of Musical Ontology’, p. 439 
126 Kania, ‘The Methodology of Musical Ontology’, p. 439 
127 ibid., p. 440 
49 
 
which need match the structure of the work perfectly.’128 The major argument 
that Kania gives for fictionalism is the Oracle argument. He does this by writing 
that it ‘would make no difference if there were no musical works, strictly 
speaking, as long as we all continued to behave as if there were.’129 Furthermore, 
he claims that there is no need to change our practices regarding musical works, 
which are valuable and successful as they are.130
 
 This argument is intended to 
show that our practices need not ontologically commit us to there being works of 
music. Kania seemingly puts forward this view with the intention of stopping 
some fruitless philosophical disputes. He claims that he has left plenty of room 
for discussion of how we conceive of musical works, which is really what 
ontologists of art should be discussing anyway. However, the clash between his 
own view and the ordinary critical practice of the discussion of musical works is 
acute enough to make his own view highly questionable. It is surely true that 
those engaged in critical discussions of works of music would all agree that the 




We hold the intuition that works of music are created by their composers. Indeed, 
Jerrold Levinson has called this ‘one of the most firmly entrenched of our beliefs 
concerning art.’131
                                                 
128 ibid. 
 Levinson also believes that part of our respect for composers 
comes from our belief that they ‘truly add to the world, in company with cake-
129 ibid. 
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bakers, house-builders, law-makers, and theory-constructers’.132
 
 However, 
creationism about works of music is a view that appears to conflict with our 
ordinary views on abstract objects. As we have already seen, Harry Deutsch 
described this kind of problem as the ‘creation problem’. This can be applied to 
the case of works of music as follows: 
1. Works of music are abstract objects. 
2. Creating an object entails bringing it into existence or causing it to exist. 
3. Abstract objects cannot stand in causal relations. 
4. Therefore, works of music are not created. 133
 
 
Because this argument is valid, philosophers have the options of rejecting one or 
more premises or accepting the conclusion. Deutsch’s own solution is to deny the 
second premise, but this account is unsuccessful, for the reasons discussed in the 
previous chapter (on fictional characters). 
 
Platonist theories of the ontology of music cannot account for the created status 
of works of music. There are two ways a Platonist can deal with this. They can 
either deny that musical works are created, or they can provide a modified 
Platonist account to allow for creation. It will be shown that both of these 
alternatives fail. 
 
Those philosophers who commit to a strict Platonism about musical works must 
deny that musical works are created. Philosophers who take this line include 
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Peter Kivy134 and Julian Dodd.135 The view of Kivy is that the activity which 
composers of works of music are engaged in is not creation, but discovery. To 
Kivy, the key to our judgements of the sort that Levinson urges is not that the 
composer is a creator, but that he is creative. A composition is thus a ‘creative 
discovery’, of similar kind to scientific or mathematical discoveries.136 There are 
two parts to this claim (creativity, and discovery), and there are problems with 
each. First, it is clear that creation and creativity are quite different concepts.137 
Creation seems to be an all-or-nothing matter: an entity is either created by such 
a person or it is not. Creativity, however, seems to be a matter of degree. It is not 
at all paradoxical to say that some creations are more creative than others. If our 
ordinary claims about creation were really just claims about creativity, it is at 
least not obvious that this should be so. As Predelli notes, ‘[t]he fact remains that 
our intuitions on this subject do not rest satisfied with the claim that artists are 
creative: we also unequivocally believe that they create’.138
 
 Showing that a 
composer is truly thought to be creative is thus not enough to give us a reason to 
doubt that works of music are created.  
The second part of the claim made by Kivy and Dodd is that works of music are 
discovered. There is an epistemological difficulty for this account. Platonists 
believe that abstracta cannot be created because creation requires causal 
interaction, and we cannot causally interact with abstracta. However, it is not 
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immediately clear that discovery does not require causal interaction. It is 
certainly the case that discoveries of concrete objects such as continents or plants 
require causal interaction with those objects. However, the analogy that Dodd 
and Kivy choose to draw is with cases of mathematical and scientific discoveries. 
Part of the purpose of this is to show that we can still regard the achievements of 
composers as great even if they are not creators. Levinson had claimed that 
composers would lose ‘a small part of the glory’ associated with their 
achievements if musical works were considered to exist eternally.139 An analogy 
to the discoveries of science is supposed to dispel this worry: as Kivy writes, 
‘[i]n the company of Newton, after all, one is hardly slumming’.140 The analogy 
is also presumably supposed to help to explain how we can see the act of 
composing as a discovery. However, there is a crucial disanalogy between the 
cases of science or mathematics and music which suggests that the action of 
composers is not best seen as discovery. R.A. Sharpe has argued that what 
genuine cases of discovery have in common is the possibility of being 
mistaken.141 Scientists (and also the discoverers of concrete objects) are 
discovering things or truths that are there anyway, and can thus be in error as to 
what they are or what they are like. This is not the case for composers. There is 
no truth discovered in the composition of a work of music, so the composer does 
not have the possibility of error in the way that a scientist might.142
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 Composers 
cannot misidentify their works, so they do not have the possibility of error in the 
140 Kivy, ‘Platonism in Music: A kind of defense’, p. 40 
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way that the discoverer of some concrete object might.143 It is not clear what 
other models of discovery are available to the Platonist.144 Dodd has responses to 
these arguments. The first of these is to say that the discovery of a musical work 
has ‘aspects in common with both discoveries in mathematics and discoveries of 
a more common-or-garden kind.’145 One thing to be noted with this response is 
that it makes the act of composition a unique kind of discovery. It is possible that 
composition is in some way unique, but this still makes it questionable what the 
analogies between music and other discoveries show. For us to see that the 
discovery of a musical work is relevantly similar to the discovery of other things, 
the Platonist needs to give us a fuller account of this discovery than has yet been 
done. Dodd’s other response is to claim that the possibility of error only applies 
to certain discoveries, namely, those that could be called discoveries by 
enquiry.146
 
 However, this again seems rather ad hoc. If the discoveries that 
composers make are so unlike the discoveries that Platonists want to draw 
analogies with, then we still lack any evidence that composers should be seen as 
discoverers. 
The most prominent proponent of the modified Platonist view of the ontology of 
musical works is Jerrold Levinson. Levinson sees the intuitive pull in treating 
works of music as sound structures, but argues that sound structures simpliciter 
cannot be identical with musical works. Instead, he identifies musical works with 
                                                 
143 Sharpe, ‘Could Beethoven have ‘Discovered’ the Archduke Trio?’, p. 326 
144 One option may be to follow Harry Deutsch, ‘The Creation Problem’, in suggesting that the 
plenitude of abstracta from which the composer can choose explains why it is impossible for a 
composer to be in error.  
145 Dodd, Works of Music, p. 118 
146 ibid., p. 120 
54 
 
what he calls ‘indicated structures’.147 His reasons for not believing that musical 
works are just sound structures are first, that sound structures cannot be created, 
and second, that there is more to the individuation of musical works than just 
how they sound.148
(1) If musical works were just sound structures, then, if two distinct composers 
determine the same sound structure, they necessarily compose the same musical 
work. (2) But distinct composers determining the same sound structure in fact 
inevitably produce different musical works. Therefore, musical works cannot be 
sound structures simpliciter.
 He argues for the second claim as follows:  
149
The evidence for this is that some aesthetic and artistic properties of a work of 
music are closely connected to the musico-historical context in which the piece 
was composed, and different composers invariably differ in musico-historical 




 Given these claims, 
Levinson needs to find an account of what a musical work is that can meet both 
the requirement of creatability, and the requirement of fine individuation 
(according to which identical sound structures composed in different musico-
historical contexts count as different works). 
Levinson’s account is that works of music are not pure sound (and performance 
means) types, but ‘indicated’ types. A musical work, according to Levinson, is a 
sound (and performance means) structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-t, where X is the 
composer and t the time of composition.151
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 Levinson claims that this meets the 
creatability requirement: 
148 He also claims that means of performance is essential to a musical work, but cannot be to a 
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An S/PM structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-t, unlike an S/PM structure simpliciter, 
does not pre-exist the activity of composition and is thus capable of being 
created. When a composer θ composes a piece of music, he indicates an S/PM 
structure ψ, but he does not bring ψ into being. However, through the act of 
indicating ψ, he does bring into being something that did not previously exist—
namely, ψ-as-indicated-by-θ-at-t1. Before the compositional act at t1, no relation 
obtains between θ and ψ. Composition establishes the relation of indication 
between θ and ψ. As a result of the compositional act, I suggest, the world 
contains a new entity, ψ-as-indicated-by-θ-at-t1. Let me call such entities 
indicated structures. And let me represent indicated structures by expressions of 
form "S/PM*x*t." It is important to realize that indicated structures are entities 
distinct from the pure structures per se from which they are derived. Thus, in 
particular, ψ*θ*t1 is not just the structure, with the accidental property of having 
been indicated by θ at t1—ψ*θ*t1 and ψ are strictly non-identical, though of 




It is not immediately clear that Levinson is right that indicated types can be 
created. As Predelli has noted, ‘in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it does 
not seem to be the case that, if you show me the tallest building on campus, you 
thereby bring into existence a new object, that is, the building-as-shown-by-
you.’153 In fact, it seems that if we accept Levinson’s view we will get a lot of 
new entities in our ontology: America-as-discovered-by-Columbus, penicillin-as-
discovered-by-Fleming, and so forth.154 Levinson in fact notes this, and just 
suggests that there is no need for us to recognise penicillin-as-discovered-by-
Fleming, but there is a need, in discussing the ontology of music, to recognise 
indicated types like sound-structures-as-indicated-by-composers.155
                                                 
152 ibid. 
 Levinson has 
153 Predelli, ‘Musical Ontology and the Argument from Creation’, p. 289 
154 This is similar to a suggestion in Gregory Currie, ‘Review of Music, Art, and Metaphysics’, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 53, no. 2, June 1993, p. 473, and in Currie, An 
Ontology of Art, p. 58 
155  Jerrold Levinson, ‘Review of An Ontology of Art’, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, vol. 52, no. 1, March 1992, p. 219 
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to do more than assure us that there is some new object to prove that it is so. It is 
easy to think that all creation on Levinson’s account involves is moving a pre-
existing entity from one ontological category to another. This is not real creation, 
as is evidenced by the fact that the view is shared by Nicholas Wolterstorff, who 
is a Platonist. Wolterstorff writes that ‘[w]hat the composer does must be 
understood as consisting in bringing it about that a preexistent kind becomes a 
work—specifically, a work of his.’156
 
 Levinson’s view of composition could be 
seen as identical to this. 
One of the problems that the claim that musical works can be identified with 
types has is that types are not creatable, so, if indicated types are types, then they 
are not creatable either. Dodd in fact explicitly responds to Levinson (as part of 
his defense of Platonism) in this way. The disagreement here is one over the 
nature of types. Levinson believes that types only exist when it is possible for 
them to have instances or tokens. If this is the case, then musical works would 
come into existence on the actions of the composer, because until then it would 
be impossible for there to be a token of the indicated type (that is, a token 
performance of the work which is appropriately related to the relevant act of 
indication). Dodd conversely argues that a type exists whenever its property-
associate exists.157 The property-associate of a type K is being a k, and it is the 
property that anything must have to be a (properly formed) token of K.158
                                                 
156 Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art, p. 89 
 The 
property-associate of the indicated type ψ-as-indicated-by-θ-at-t1 is ‘having the 
sonic structure determined by ψ, and also being produced in a way that is 
properly connected to [θ’s act of indication at t1]’, and, because Dodd believes 
157 Dodd, Works of Music, pp. 104-105 
158 ibid., p. 49 
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that all properties exist at all times, this property must exist at all times.159
 
 This 
implies that the indicated type with which Levinson wanted to identify the work 
exists at all times as well, and therefore cannot be created. Because Levinson 
accepts that types cannot be created, this argument is a serious problem for his 
view.  
Robert Howell has responded to Dodd in defense of the indicated-type view.160 
The key point in Howell’s defense is that indicated types cannot exist until the 
entities which they ‘essentially involve’ exist.161 Because works of music 
essentially involve their composers and the composer’s mental acts, they do not 
exist before those acts occur. This means that they come into existence at some 
time, which is to say that (given that their coming into existence is deliberately 
caused) they are created. Dodd’s response to this is that it involves an incorrect 
view of properties. Howell claims that particular entities (such as composers) can 
be ‘involved’ in properties, such as ‘having the sonic structure determined by ψ, 
and also being produced in a way that is properly connected to [θ’s act of 
indication at t1]’. Dodd disagrees. He argues that it does not make sense to 
suppose that a concrete particular can be a part of a property, which is abstract.162 
For a performance to be a token of a musical work, the performance itself (a 
concrete object) must be appropriately related to the composer, but the work (on 
Dodd’s view a Platonic type) need not be.163
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abstracta (as both Dodd and Howell believe they should be), then the claim that 
160 Robert Howell, ‘Types, Indicated and Initiated’, British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 42, no. 2, 
April 2002, pp. 105-127 
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concrete objects can be a part of them is obscure, and Howell’s defence of 
Levinson’s view fails. 
 
An elaboration of Levinson’s and Wolterstorff’s views has been attempted by 
James C. Anderson. Following Wolterstorff, Anderson takes works of music to 
be norm-kinds. Following Levinson, he takes musical works to be created by 
their composers. He reconciles the two positions (as Wolterstorff does not) by 
claiming that although descriptive kinds cannot be created, norm-kinds can.164 A 
descriptive kind is a kind as ordinarily understood, and a norm-kind is a kind 
such that it can have properly and improperly-formed instances.165 A norm-kind 
has certain properties normative within it, namely, those properties without 
which an object cannot be a properly formed example of the kind.166 The way 
that Anderson links this to the creation of musical works is by arguing that the 
composer of a work creates a norm-kind by treating certain of the properties of a 
descriptive kind as normative within it. He claims that a created norm-kind is a 
descriptive-kind which some person at some time has made normative.167 
Levinson himself cites Anderson’s argument as a useful elaboration of his own 
views: ‘Making-normative certainly at least helps explain what indicating 
consists in, and differentiates it from other activities of an intentional nature 
directed at abstract structures.’168
                                                 
164 James C. Anderson, ‘Musical Kinds’, British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 25, no. 1, Jan. 1985,  
p. 47 
 However, this view is no more successful than 
Levinson’s own in showing that a composer has created a new object. Making a 
165 Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art, p. 56 
166 ibid., p. 7 
167 Anderson, ‘Musical Kinds’, p. 47 
168 Jerrold Levinson, ‘What a Musical Work Is, Again’ in his Music, Art, and Metaphysics (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 260-261 in Stefano Predelli, ‘Musical Ontology and 
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descriptive kind into a normative kind would seem to involve selecting a 
descriptive kind and declaring that certain of the properties within it should be 
treated as normative. This no more involves bringing into existence an entirely 
new object than indication does. As Predelli again argues: ‘although the 
composer invites us to consider [the descriptive kind] in a certain manner, and 
although such an invitation may not have been issued before, it must still be the 
case that, in the absence of independent considerations to the contrary, the object 
in question, the descriptive kind, is blessed with eternal (or a-temporal) 
existence.’169
 
 This is surely correct. Making a descriptive kind normative is a 
matter of holding a particular attitude to a thing that is already there, not one of 
making something new. Anderson’s elaboration of Levinson’s view thus also 
fails to meet the creatability requirement. 
The account of the creation of works of music that will be defended is one on 
which works of music are created when their first embodiments are produced, (or 
perhaps when they are made publicly available, if that is a different thing). The 
term ‘embodiment’ comes from Guy Rohrbaugh. Embodiments are the physical 
objects (in the case of works of music, scores, performances, recordings and 
suchlike) that ground the facts about what the work is like.170
                                                 
169 Predelli, ‘Musical Ontology and the Argument from Creation’, p. 291 
 The general 
relationship between a work of music and its embodiments is one of ontological 
dependence. This makes Rohrbaugh’s view similar to Thomasson’s view of 
fictional characters, according to which they ontologically depend on some 
concrete objects, such as copies of the books in which they appear. The 
ontological dependence of works of music on some physical things explains how 
170 Rohrbaugh, ‘Artworks as Historical Individuals’, p. 191 
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it is that they are things that exist in time. A work of music can come into 
existence when its first embodiment is produced (or is made publicly available).  
 
Our evidence for the existence of musical works is that there are true sentences 
like 
(8) In This House, On This Morning is a suite. 
 
This sentence must be true no later than the time at which informed critics can 
truly utter (8), so the creation of the work must happen no later than this. It can 
only be truly asserted from the time at which there is some publicly available 
(where ‘publicly available’ should be understood quite loosely) object which can 
ground the truth of (8). This will most likely be at the production of the first 
score of In This House, On This Morning, though it may be on the production of 
the first performance of the work (but only if this happens before the score 
becomes publicly available), or even on the broadcast of a recording of the work 
(but only if neither a score or a publicly available performance has happened 
previously). This is analogous to the claim made in the previous chapter 
regarding fictional characters, which come into existence when a work 
containing them becomes publicly available. Creating any work of music is a 
matter of producing some physical object or objects that can ground what the 
work is like, and inform those who are interested what the work is like.  
 
The view just discussed is quite similar to that held by Robert Howell, although 
Howell believes that works of music are types. His claims also appear to be 
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applicable to the creation of other abstract works of art as well as works of music. 
He writes: 
Insofar as types arise out of human practices … those types exist only through 
those practices. They are thus temporally initiated entities that have instances of 
their own. The type does not exist until the pattern [an arrangement of parts or 
features specified by a property] actually takes on the property of being used in 
the community in the relevant way (or at least of being put in a position so to be 
used), and the pattern does not take on that property until the community 
actually so uses it (or is prepared so to use it).171
 
 
He adds in a footnote: 
The type exists when the community is put in the position to produce and 
recognise the instances. Whether the community then does so depends on 
further factors. I take the idea of the community’s being put in that position 
quite broadly. It includes cases in which the composer mentally sounds out a 
piece she never communicates or scores a work that is never performed, even in 
imagination. However, such a broad construal is not essential to my view. I also 
allow for types, the existence of which is implied by the existence of those types 
that community practice explicitly establishes. (If someone establishes baseball 
or chess, then the community is put in a position to produce and recognize all 




Though it has been shown that types cannot be created, so Howell’s account of 
musical works is unsuccessful, this account of creation may be what happens 
when artefacts such as works of music are created. What is required for the work 
to exist is for the community to be able to recognise the work (if they are 
appropriately informed) and use or discuss the work, and to create it requires 
whatever action puts the community in the position of being able to do this. 
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It seems natural for philosophers to suppose that works of music are types, or 
kinds, or universals. This is because of the repeatability of musical works. 
Philosophers who hold this view (both Platonists and modified Platonists) 
contend that the work is a type (universal) and the performances of it are tokens 
(instantiations). The repeatability of musical works is an important datum for 
ontologists of music, so it is something that any theorist on this issue has to 
respect.173
 
 Universals are themselves the topic of much philosophical 
controversy, so it may be suggested that answering the question of the ontology 
of works of music by appealing to universals does not make matters so much 
clearer. However, this is of itself not enough of a reason to reject the view of 
works of music as types. 
A common view of the ontological status of musical works, beginning with 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, is that they are norm-kinds, as were discussed in the 
previous section.174 On this view, musical works can be performed correctly or 
incorrectly, and to varying degrees. This is often introduced as a contrast to the 
views of Nelson Goodman, who held that, for a performance to qualify as a 
performance of a particular work, it could not have a single wrong note. This 
view is strongly unintuitive, but Goodman claimed that believing otherwise was 
untenable.175
                                                 
173 Julian Dodd seems to suggest that it is the most important intuition, and should be respected 
above all others. See Dodd, Works of Music, p. 3 
 The reason he has for holding this view is as follows: 
174 Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art, p. 56 
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The innocent-seeming principle that performances differing by just one note are 
instances of the same work risks the consequence—in view of the transitivity of 
identity—that all performances whatsoever are of the same work. If we allow 
the least deviation, all assurance of work-preservation and score-preservation is 
lost; for by a series of one-note errors of omission, addition, and modification, 
we can go all the way from Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony to Three Blind Mice.176
 
 
This seems to simply be a case of taking our philosophical theories too seriously 
and the art that is being discussed not seriously enough. Theories of the ontology 
of art should not be vastly revisionary of artistic practice, and the claim that it is 
impossible for a performance of a work to have a single wrong note clearly is 
revisionary. Goodman’s position also makes it much too easy to become a great 
composer. Because a single different note makes a different work, a new work 
can be created by adding a note on to the end of an existing (great) work. This 
consequence is not appealing, because it is an obvious fact that not just anyone 
can compose a work of genius. 
 
As has been mentioned earlier, Julian Dodd argues that works of music must be 
kinds. There are difficulties with this view that he attempts to deal with. One 
problem for Dodd and Wolterstorff is that we hold as true sentences such as 
(10)  Bach’s Violin Concerto BWV 1041 ends with an A minor chord.177
 
 
If Bach’s Violin Concerto BWV 1041 is an abstract object, as Dodd and 
Wolterstorff think it is, then it cannot be extended in time. On Dodd’s view, 
types are also unstructured, so do not contain notes as parts at all. Because of this, 
(10) cannot be straightforwardly true: Bach’s Violin Concerto BWV 1041 does 
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not contain any A minor chords. However, Dodd and Wolterstorff each seek to 
hold on to the intuition that (10) and other sentences of similar form can be true. 
To do this, they first note that ‘ends with an A minor chord’ can be truly 
predicated of a performance of a work of music. So,  
(11) This performance of Bach’s Violin Concerto BWV 1041 ended with an A 
minor chord. 
 
can be straightforwardly true (when the utterer is appropriately situated before a 
performance of the concerto). The predicate ‘ends with an A minor chord’ must 
thus have a different meaning in (10) than in (11) for both sentences to be true. 
Wolterstorff agrees that the predicate differs in meaning in the two sentences, but 
claims that there is a ‘systematic relation’ between them.178
Suppose that ‘is-f’ is a predicate which can be shared between an art work W 
and its examples, and suppose further that a property for which ‘is-f’ stands 
when truly predicated of examples of W is being-f. Then for those cases in 
which the sharing of ‘is-f’ fits the general pattern which we formulated, ‘is-f’ 
when truly predicated of W stands for the property of being such that something 
cannot be a correct example of it without having the property of being-f. Or in 
other words, it stands for the property of having the property of being-f 
normative within it. If [ending with an A minor chord] is a property that a 
sound-sequence-occurrence can have, then to predicate [ends with an A minor 
chord] of [Bach’s Violin Concerto BWV 1041] is not to claim of [Bach’s 
concerto] that it has that property. It is rather to claim that that property is 
normative within [Bach’s concerto].
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The sharing of predicates between works of music and performances is thus an 
example of what Wolterstorff calls ‘analogical predication’.180
 
 Predicates which 
are normally understood to be shared between works of music and their 
performances and that literally apply to any correct performance apply, by 
analogy, to the works themselves. The notion of analogical predication is used by 
Dodd to meet objections which suggest that certain claims we make about works 
of music (such as (10)) are incompatible with Platonism about works of music. 
He can retain an account according to which works of music are unstructured 
while allowing that statements which appear to imply that they are structured are 
true. However, it is still notable that Dodd’s view requires predicates in sentences 
such as (10) to have other than their usual meanings, and this is a cost (though 
Dodd believes a minor one) of the Platonist view.  
Abstract objects are generally taken to be unable to enter into causal relations. 
Works of music are generally taken to be able to be heard. Hearing seems to 
require a causal relation. This is a problem for the view that works of music are 
types. (Audibility is also a problem for the view that works of music are concrete 
objects, but for different reasons.) One option for the Platonist about music to 
take is to claim that works of music cannot be heard, but that only performances 
of them can. However, most Platonists are unwilling to take this step. As Dodd 
writes: ‘We hear works performed; we do not merely hear performances of them. 
Someone who had clearly listened attentively to a performance of In This House, 
On This Morning, but who nonetheless insisted that she had never heard the work, 
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would be looked upon with bewilderment by her fellow concert-goers.’181 An 
account is therefore required of how this abstract object can be audible. Dodd 
provides such an account. The claim that he makes is that we can hear a work of 
music because we can hear the performances (tokens) of it: ‘A work of music … 
can enter into causal relations derivatively by virtue of being a type of sound-
event: a type whose token events can feature as relata of causal relations. Hence, 
given that the objects of perception are just those things that causally effect how 
things perceptually seem to us, this means that the type/token theory is not 
precluded from saying that works of music, in addition to their tokens, may be 
heard.’182 Levinson makes a similar point from within an indicated type account, 
by claiming that we hear a sound-structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-t by hearing an 
instance of the sound structure produced by performers who are guided by the 
composer’s indication of it.183
 
 
David Davies has argued against Dodd by claiming that an entity to which 
predicates ascribing sonic properties apply only analogously cannot be literally 
audible.184
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 This may not seem to be a problem: we do not tend to think of 
Platonic objects as being literally audible. However, Dodd believes that the 
audibility of musical works is evidence in favour of treating the type/token view 
as the default view of the ontological status of musical works: ‘Musical works, 
besides being repeatable, are also audible. When listening to a performance of a 
work of music, one thereby listens to the work performed… A further benefit of 
the type/token theory is that it smoothly explains how such indirect listening is 
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possible…’185 If Dodd’s theory implies that works of music are only audible in 
an analogous sense, the claim that the audibility of works of music is evidence 
for Platonism will be undercut. Davies claims that, on Dodd’s view, the 
audibility of a work of music just consists in all of the instances of the work 
being audible. However, any view of the ontology of music will recognise that 
all instances of a work of music (that is, performances) are audible.186 It would 
beg the question in favour of Dodd’s view to claim that all instances of a work of 
music are tokens of a type in what Davies calls a ‘metaphysically freighted 
sense’.187
 
 If works of music only have audibility analogously, then, their 
audibility cannot count as evidence for the type-token theory ahead of other 
views of the ontological status of musical works. This is not a knock-down 
objection to Platonism about musical works, but does serve to seriously weaken 
the motivation for the view. 
There are further reasons for doubting that works of music can be types. One of 
the most important of these is that works of music are modally flexible, but types 
are not.188 To say that something is modally flexible is to say that it (the very 
same object) could have been intrinsically different, or different ‘in and of 
itself’.189 It certainly seems intuitively true that many works of music could have 
been different than they are. For instance, ‘Bruckner’s Ninth Symphony might 
have been finished had he lived longer’.190
                                                 
185 Dodd, Works of Music, p. 11 
 This sentence is meaningful, and 
would generally be held to be true by those engaged in critical discussions of 
186 D. Davies, ‘Dodd on the ‘Audibility’ of Musical Works’, pp. 104-105 
187 ibid., p. 105 
188 Rohrbaugh, ‘Artworks as Historical Individuals’, p. 181 
189 ibid. 
190 ibid., p. 182 
68 
 
music. The claim that it makes is that a certain work of music could have been 
different, because finished. If types are modally inflexible, Bruckner’s Ninth 
Symphony must not be a type. Analogous claims can of course be made for any 
work of music: the work could have differed by a few notes here and there while 
remaining the very same work. Platonists about works of music are forced to 
claim that in such examples the works that we would ordinarily consider to be 
modified or completed works of music are in fact different works. Dodd at this 
point bites the bullet, but claims that ‘none of this is so counter-intuitive as to 
undo all the good work that the type/token theory has done up to now.’191
 
 It in 
fact seems highly revisionary of ordinary critical practice regarding music to 
treat works as modally inflexible, and critical practice should be the primary 
guide to the ontological status of works of music. 
Guy Rohrbaugh claims that there is another difference between works of music 
(or other repeatable works of art) and types: works of music are temporally 
flexible.192 An object is temporally flexible ‘if and only if it is subject, in 
principle, to change in its properties over time’.193
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 Rohrbaugh is concerned to 
draw analogies between different kinds of works of art, and takes it as clear that a 
painting can change its properties over time, for instance by having the paint fade. 
It is less immediately clear how a work of music could change: it seems that once 
the composer has created it, how it is has been determined for good. Rohrbaugh 
does note the intuitive pull of this idea, but argues that musical works should be 
able to treated like any other works of art, and that ‘a general framework which 
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allows for the possibility of change in all artworks is the more powerful one’.194 
Though the idea of a unified ontology of art is an appealing one, it seems 
question-begging to appeal to such when making substantive claims, such as the 
claim that musical works are temporally flexible. Rohrbaugh does make an 
attempt to explain how musical works could be temporally flexible even though 
our intuitions would suggest that they are not. The suggestion he makes is that 
the existence of a notational system which allows musical works to be scored 
prevents works of music from changing over time, in a similar way to how a 
glass case may prevent a painting from changing.195 Thus, most musical works 
do not, as a matter of fact, change over time (though they may, if the composer 
revises them after they are completed), though it is still in principle possible for 
this to happen. However, there can be responses made to the claim that works of 
music are temporally flexible. Dodd argues that it is more plausible to think of 
purported cases of a work of music changing as cases where a composer 
produces a new version of the piece of music (which to Dodd is a distinct work 
of music, though one in most respects similar to the original).196 This account 
seems to meet our intuitions at least as well as Rohrbaugh’s. Dodd also claims 
that when an object changes, the object as it was before the change no longer 
exists, and, as the original work of music continues to exist (continues to be 
performable) after it has been revised, it cannot be considered to be an earlier 
temporal stage of the same object.197
                                                 
194 ibid., p. 188 
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work of music to change with respect to its intrinsic properties over time, and 
Rohrbaugh’s appeal to the temporal flexibility of works of music fails. However, 
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his claim that they are modally flexible is enough on its own to show that works 
of music are not types. 
 
John Dilworth has raised a further problem for indicated type theories about 
works of music. He calls this the ‘type specification problem’.198 According to 
Levinson, sound structures exist at all times. These types do not have any 
musical properties until they have been indicated by a composer at some time. 
Dilworth claims that it is necessary for an indicated type theory to be able to tell 
us precisely which type has been indicated: ‘If more than one were indicated, or 
it turned out to be trivial or arbitrary which one was, then, indication of a 
particular type as such would be explanatorily irrelevant to the logical and 
ontological issues concerning the creation and individuation of musical 
works’.199 Unless an indicated type theory can tell us exactly which type has 
been indicated, it cannot help us see which object the work of music is. Dilworth 
contends that indicated type theories cannot do this. The first option for an 
indicated type theorist is to suggest that the sound-structure (type) that has been 
indicated is one whose tokens are identical to each other. However, the 
suggestion that the type which has been indicated is fully determinate, as it must 
be on that account, is far too restrictive. The reason for this is that if all tokens of 
the low-level type are sonically indistinguishable, then all tokens of the indicated 
type will be as well.200
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performances can have wrong notes, this option is unsuccessful. If, however, the 
indicated type theorist wants to suggest that tokens of the indicated type may be 
allowed to vary in some of their properties, they run into different problems. The 
most important of these is that there cannot then be a single sound-event type 
indicated by the composer.201 There will in fact be an infinite number of slightly 
different sound structures that could each be tokened by a legitimate performance 
of the work. If this is the case, then it does not seem that there is any way for us 
to know which sound structure the composer was indicating, and thus which 
object the work of music is. This problem cannot be solved by arguing that the 
relevant type is the one which matches the correct performance-tokens, because, 
prior to the act of indication, there is no musical work, and thus no possible 
performances, correct or incorrect.202
 
 Dilworth thus concludes that indicated type 
theories are fundamentally flawed. 
A major difficulty for the view that works of music are not types but individuals 
is to account for the fact that there can be many performances of the same work. 
It is not obvious how to account for the repeatability of musical works while 
maintaining that they are individuals, not types. Rohrbaugh suggests that the 
performances of a work of music are not instances of the work, but occurrences 
of it.203
                                                 
201 ibid., p. 16 
 On Rohrbaugh’s view, ‘occurrence of’ is a relation between two 
individuals: the performance and the work. Performances of a work of music are 
a subclass of the embodiments of the work of music. Rohrbaugh writes that ‘[i]t 
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historical flow which sustains the objects’.204 What this is saying is that 
occurrences (in the case of works of music, performances) are the way in which 
what interests us about the work is presented: ‘The ‘occurrence of’ relation is 
then a more specific form of the embodiment relation, one conditioned by the 
needs of the practice of a particular art form and one which picks out those 
embodiments which display the qualities of the work of art and are relevant to 
appreciation and criticism.’205
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 They are not identical to the work, because a work 
of music has many properties that a performance of it does not. However, they 
present the salient features of the work’s sound to an audience, and allow many 
of the critical judgements that are made of music to be made. How does this help 
answer the question of how a work of music, which is an abstract object, can be 
heard? The work is not identical to the performance, but the performance is part 
of the class of things on which the work ontologically depends. This is not 
enough, because the work also ontologically depends on (for instance) the 
printing of scores for the work, but hearing this happening would not count as 
hearing the work. If ‘performance of’ is a relation, and performances present the 
qualities of the work with which critics are interested, then it seems 
uncomfortably like a brute fact that we can hear a work (which is abstract) by 
hearing a performance. However, the postulation of brute facts is not as much of 
a problem as it may seem. If we are studying our ordinary critical practice to find 
out what works of music are like, and our ordinary practice tells us that we can 
hear a work of music by hearing a performance, then it must be so. If works of 
music are abstract, then, they are the kind of abstracta that can be heard 








Unlike fictional characters, fictions are commonly thought to exist. Anyone who 
is a realist about fictional characters or works of music because of the fact that 
we refer to them and quantify over them will doubtless accept the existence of 
works of fiction as well. Anti-realists about fictional characters and works of 
music are also likely to be realists about fictions. In fact, many attempts to 
account for the purported non-existence of fictional characters implicitly rely on 
the assumption that fictions exist, which tends to be taken for granted. Any 
‘According to the fiction’ locutions (that are taken to be true) presuppose that 
there are fictions, as does the prefix fictionalist account. In fact, fictionalists (at 
least prefix fictionalists) about any domain would seem to presuppose that the 
fictions which they use to analyse the claims of that domain exist. Realists and 
anti-realists about other abstract works of art would thus seem to share the belief 
that fictions exist. 
  
There are reductionist views about works of fiction. Nominalists seek to reduce 
works of fiction to some concrete objects. One way to do this is to treat a work of 
fiction as the set of concrete copies of a text. However, it is clear that the set of 
copies of a work of fiction cannot be identified with the work. A work of fiction 
does not grow when new copies are printed, or shrink when they are destroyed. 
Sets also contain their members essentially, whereas it is not the case that a work 
of fiction would not have existed had some of the copies of it never been printed. 
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Identifying a work with the set of its copies gets the order of explanation 
backwards. Copies are copies of the work, and they can be identified as such 
(even if they contain minor errors). We cannot see whether two copies are copies 
of the same work by seeing if they are members of the appropriate set – they are 
members of the appropriate set because they are copies of the same work. This is 
analogous to the case of music, where we group performances according to 
which work they are of, instead of finding the work by considering the set of 
performances. However, the analogy is not exact, because musical scores are 
more like instructions and manuscripts (the concrete objects that are copied to 
produce works of fiction) are more like prototypes. Whether something is a copy 
of a particular work of fiction depends on its causal history. For a book to be a 
copy of a particular work of fiction, it must be intended to be a copy of that work, 
and be produced by copying (or copying a copy of, or …) whatever concrete 
object originally grounded what the work is like (presumably the author’s 
manuscript).206 This allows for copies produced from divergent chains to count 
as copies of the same work of fiction, as long as the causal origin is the same.207
 
 
There may be cases where this conditional is met but there is such a radical 
failure to copy the work accurately that it does not intuitively seem to be a copy 
of the work that has been produced. Because we do not in practice have strong 
intuitions about how accurate a purported copy of a work of fiction must be to 
count as a copy (and because our practices are the best evidence we have to go 
by), we may have to just admit that there are fuzzy cases. It does not seem that 
this does any damage to the arguments given here.  
                                                 




A different reductionist theory is action theory, according to which works of 
fiction are (either type or token) actions by authors. David Davies208 and Gregory 
Currie209 are two action theorists about works of fiction. Currie’s view that a 
work of art is a compositional action is compatible with his speech-act definition 
of fiction.210 In trying to provide a definition of fiction in terms of what kind of 
speech act (or illocutionary action) the author is performing, Currie follows John 
Searle.211 Searle’s view is that a work of fiction is not a speech act at all. The 
author of a work of fiction is, in writing the work of fiction, pretending to make 
assertions. It is a pretended illocutionary act (though a real utterance act). The 
major reason that Searle gives for thinking that the author of a fiction is not 
performing an illocutionary act is that which illocutionary act the utterance of a 
sentence performs depends on the meaning of the sentence.212
committed to the view that words do not have their normal meanings in 
works of fiction. That view is at least prima facie an impossible view 
since if it were true it would be impossible for anyone to understand a 
work of fiction without learning a new set of meanings for all the words 
and other elements contained in the work of fiction, and since any 
sentence whatever can occur in a work of fiction, in order to have the 
 If writing a fiction 
is a distinct illocutionary act from making an assertion, then (on Searle’s view) 
the meaning of a sentence used in a work of fiction must be different than the 
meaning of the same sentence when it is used to make an assertion. Searle writes 
that this means that anyone who argues that writing fiction is a distinct 
illocutionary act is:  
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ability to read any work of fiction, a speaker of the language would have 
to learn the language all over again, since every sentence in the language 
would have both a fictional and a nonfictional meaning.213
 
 
Searle then goes on to give a positive definition of fiction. He claims that the 
author of a work of fiction is engaged in a ‘nondeceptive pseudoperformance 
which constitutes pretending to recount to us a series of events’.214 The words 
used in a work of fiction have their ordinary meanings, but there are conventions 
of fiction which remove the ordinary commitments that are required by these 
meanings.215
 
 This view has an obvious disadvantage: in order to keep fictional 
and non-fictional meanings identical, it requires us to accept that the way 
language is used in fiction is of a completely different kind to the way it is used 
otherwise. The conventions that Searle invokes seem to add a degree of difficulty 
to our reading of fiction which is not in fact present. 
Currie rejects Searle’s arguments, and claims that fiction-making is itself a 
distinct illocutionary act. Currie correctly points out that the author of a work of 
fiction is not pretending to do anything, but is really performing the act of 
making a work of fiction. Currie argues that in order to be making a work of 
fiction (performing the illocutionary act of fiction-making), the author must 
produce an utterance that he intends readers to make-believe.216 Furthermore, at 
least part of the reason for readers to make-believe the utterance is the 
recognition that the author intends them to do this.217
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successful than Searle’s pretended utterance account. The author is performing 
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an action of making a fiction, with the intent that the audience will treat it as a 
work of fiction. On the action theory view, the fiction is in fact the act of 
producing the utterance, and not the utterance (qua object) itself (hence the 
compatibility between Currie’s two views). However, Currie’s account can still 
serve as an acceptable definition of fiction even if we regard the utterance qua 
object, and not the performance, as the fiction. It seems intuitively clear that we 
do not treat a work of fiction as the performance of creating it: when we read a 
book, we do not consider ourselves to be gaining access to the author’s action of 




As we have seen before, the claim that abstract objects such as fictions can be 
created is controversial. Deutsch’s ‘creation problem’ can again be taken to apply 
to works of fiction.218
 
 The argument, briefly, is that fictions are abstract objects, 
and abstract objects are generally held to exist necessarily. This means that it is 
impossible to create abstract objects. Anyone who holds this view will need to 
argue that, contrary to our intuitions, authors select, and not create, their fictions. 
The responses to be made to this argument in the case of works of fiction will be 
similar to those in the cases of fictional characters and works of music.  
 
To deny the first premise of Deutsch’s argument (that fictions are abstract objects) 
would be to claim that fictions are concrete objects. The most plausible way to 
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do this is to suppose that fictions are copies (or sets of copies) of the fiction. This 
nominalistic strategy fails, for reasons given earlier. Anyone who does accept 
that works of fictions are concrete objects in this way would have to accept that 
works of fiction are created. It is uncontroversial that (concrete) books can be 
created, so denying the first premise of Deutsch’s argument will not help the 
anti-creationist. 
  
Like in the cases of music and of fictional characters, the third premise of 
Deutsch’s argument can be denied. This is to claim that works of fiction can 
stand in causal relations, and so can be created. That works of fiction are created 
is the view that will be defended here. 
 
A reason for thinking that works of fiction are created is that creationism about 
fictions allows us to individuate fictions in an intuitively correct way. The cases 
that illustrate this point are the cases which show that the same text can be the 
text of different fictions. The most famous of these is Borges’s Pierre Menard 
case. In the philosopher’s version of this story, Menard writes a text which is 
word-for-word identical with Don Quixote.219 However, Menard’s work is a 
different work to Cervantes’s, because it has radically different (aesthetic) 
properties. Arthur Danto writes that Borges made a ‘stupendous’ contribution to 
the ontology of art, by showing that a work’s location in the history of literature 
and relationship to its author ‘penetrate[s], so to speak, the essence of the 
work’.220
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abstracta. This is because eternally existing abstracta are not located in the 
history of literature or related to their authors. Because the philosopher’s version 
of the story is arguably not entirely true to Borges’s story,221 Gregory Currie has 
invented another example to make the same point. In Currie’s thought 
experiment, Jane Austen and Anne Radcliffe each produce identical texts, titled 
‘Northanger Abbey’.222 Radcliffe’s (hitherto unknown) piece was written ten 
years earlier than Austen’s, and was intended to be a genuine contribution to the 
genre of Gothic novels. Austen’s piece was a burlesque of the Gothic novel.223 
The two pieces have different properties. Austen’s work has implicit references 
to other works in the genre, but Radcliffe’s does not (Radcliffe’s work was 
written earlier than some of them). There is irony to be found in Austen’s work 
that is not there in Radcliffe’s.224
 
 This is supposed to be a case in which there are 
two works (of fiction) but only one text. 
If there are two works in this case, but only one text, there must be something 
that grounds this difference. The two have different aesthetic properties, but this 
is not quite enough. The difference in aesthetic properties comes from the fact 
that it is appropriate to interpret the two works differently. However, the fact that 
it is possible to interpret two word-for-word identical works differently is not 
enough to explain what it is that makes the two different. It is of course possible 
(as Borges reminds us in his Pierre Menard story) to interpret one work in two 
(or more) different ways, but this does not seem to imply that this work is in fact 
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two works. In fact, if different possible interpretations make different works, then 
any moderately or highly complex work of fiction will not be a single work at all, 
but a number of different (but textually indiscernible) works. This is strongly 
counterintuitive. We believe that, for instance, Henry James’s The Turn of the 
Screw is just one work of fiction, even though two distinct interpretations of it 
are available (either the governess is really seeing ghosts or she is imagining it). 
Because of this, different interpretations are not enough to imply that there are 
different works. There must therefore be some additional reason that it is 
appropriate to interpret Austen’s and Radcliffe’s works differently, if they are 
taken to be different works. The most plausible reason is that the two originate in 
different acts of creation. Austen created a different work than Radcliffe created, 
and it is because of this that the two have different aesthetic properties. This 
seems to have the order of explanation right. Although it may be because of the 
differences in aesthetic properties that we know that the two are different works, 
these properties are not prior to the creation of the work. It is the work as created 
by its particular creator that grounds the aesthetic properties in question. Works 
of fiction, then, must be created if our ordinary practices of individuating works 
from each other are to be sustained. 
 
A modified Platonist attempt to account for the creation of works of fiction is 
Jerrold Levinson’s view that works are ‘indicated types’. This is analogous to his 
view of musical works (and can be held for similar reasons).225
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 On this account, 
a work of fiction is a word structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-t, where X is the author 
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of the work and t is the time at which he creates it.226
 
 This strategy fails to 
account for the creation of works of fiction for the same reason that it fails to 
account for the creation of works of music. The problem is that a word sequence-
as-indicated-by-X-at-t is not a distinct object from the word sequence (which 
Levinson takes to pre-exist the author’s action). Indicating a pre-existing type 
may be enough to move some entity (the type) from one ontological category to 
another (from ‘pure word sequence’ to ‘work of fiction’), but is not enough to 
literally create anything. Furthermore, if types (word sequences) are not creatable, 
which Levinson grants (hence the need for the new ontological category of 
indicated types), and indicated types are types (as they seem to be, given that 
they have the properties that suggest that works of fiction may be types, such as 
repeatability), then indicated types are not creatable either. If indicated types are 
not creatable, then they fail to satisfactorily account for our beliefs about works 
of fiction, and if they are not types then their claim to the advantages of type 
theories appears questionable. Treating works of fiction as indicated types is thus 
unsuccessful. 
Works of fiction are created when authors perform certain acts (writing and 
having published pieces of fiction) within a certain cultural context. This is a sign 
of the dependence of fictional works on mental states. They are dependent on the 
particular acts of their particular authors.227
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other acts somewhat like them), a particular work of fiction could not have come 
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reception for the works.228 This context includes there being someone capable of 
understanding the language of the work, and also having our practices of dealing 
with works of fiction. The dependence on context of reception is a generic 
dependence because works are dependent merely on there being some reader 
located in an appropriate context of reception, not on any particular reader.229
 
 
Like other works of art and other abstract artefacts, works of fiction are multiply 
dependent. They cannot come into existence without their acts of creation, and 
cannot continue to exist without the continuation of the practices that allow us to 
know that they exist. 
 These considerations should allow us to find out when it is that a work of fiction 
has been created. Unsurprisingly, the answer is similar to that in the case of 
fictional characters. A work of fiction exists from no later than the time at which 
we can direct our critical practices towards it (or the time at which we can read 
it). This is so because it is these critical practices that allow us to infer that the 
work exists. The time at which we can direct critical practices toward the work is 
the time at which it becomes publicly accessible, which is the time that it is 
published. Works of fiction thus come into existence at (or no later than) the time 
that they are published. 
 
The view of the existence conditions for fictions given here is rather similar to 
that suggested by Peter Lamarque: 
Literary works are cultural objects, dependent on a practice governed by social 
conventions concerning the production and reception of texts. As they owe their 
nature and existence to the practice, should the practice cease (the conventions 









On this view, the existence of fictional works comes out of our practices of 
dealing with fictional texts, much like Stephen Schiffer231
 
 argues with regards to 
fictional characters. This means that works of fiction are not mind-independent. 
Even if texts can exist mind-independently (and it is surely true that copies of our 
works of fiction could continue to exist if there were no humans), works of 
fiction require people with particular social conventions. Furthermore, what 
works of fiction are like is determined (and created) by these conventions.  
4.3 Individuals 
 
Fictions seem far more amenable than fictional characters to being treated in 
type/token terms. This is because fictions, like works of music, seem to be 
repeatable. Many different physical objects (generally books, but possibly also 
spoken utterances or even audio recordings) can be copies of the same fiction. 
The copy of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland on my bookshelf is a copy of the 
same work of fiction as other copies elsewhere. The type/token view would see 
any (correct) copies of a fiction as tokens of the abstract type (word sequence) 
with which the fiction is to be identified. However, as Danto notes, this could 
apply to any texts, whether works of fiction or government pamphlets.232
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Repeatability is a property shared by fictional and non-fictional works, whether 
or not there are other such properties as well. 
231 Schiffer, ‘Language-Created Language-Independent Entities’, pp. 156-157 




Fictions are taken by some philosophers to be norm-kinds. Norm-kinds are kinds 
which can have both correct and incorrect instances.233
 
 This allows for copies of 
a fiction which contain misprints to still count as genuine copies of the fiction. It 
is clearly the case that copies of a fiction can contain misprints without losing 
their identity, so a view of this kind has a clear advantage over a pure Platonist or 
Goodman-style nominalist account that did not allow for this, as has been 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
A common topic of discussion in the ontology of fiction is whether the work is 
identical to the text. A text should be understood as a particular sequence of 
words. It sometimes seems to be assumed that word sequences, and thus texts, 
are eternally existing abstracta, or types. It is not entirely clear that we should 
believe that they are. Given that it seems impossible for words to exist eternally 
and necessarily,234 it doesn’t seem as if sequences of words should either. Maybe 
it is the case that once the words exist, the word sequences are an ontological free 
lunch. Texts thus do not exist eternally or necessarily, but do exist as long as the 
relevant words exist. This is enough for them to exist before any works of fiction 
do.235
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Readers and critics have to take themselves to be reading a work, not (merely) a 
text, in order to interpret the work.  
 
Amie Thomasson draws a threefold distinction between texts, compositions, and 
works: 
By “text” I mean a sequence of symbols in a language (or languages); by 
“composition” I mean roughly the text as created by a certain author in certain 
historical circumstances; by “literary work” I mean roughly the novel, poem, 
short story, or so forth having certain aesthetic and artistic qualities and 
ordinarily telling a tale concerning various characters and events. 236
 
 
Though I will not be using the term ‘composition’, the definitions Thomasson 
gives for ‘text’ and ‘work’ are substantially similar to those used here.  
 
An option for anyone who thinks that works of fiction are types is to treat works 
of fiction purely syntactically, that is, purely as sequences of line-shape types, as 
suggested by Yagisawa.237
The story A Study in Scarlet is a collection of English sentences, which Doyle 
wrote in 1886. English sentences are sequences of English words in conformity 
with the syntactic rules of English. English words are those sequences of letters 
which are included in the vocabulary of English. The vocabulary of English is a 
finite list of sequences of letters from the English alphabet. A sequence of 
sequences of things is a sequence of those things. So, the literary work, A Study 
in Scarlet, is a collection of sequences of the letters of English alphabet in 
conformity with certain syntactic rules. As such, the work is at least as abstract 
as any sequence of letters, which in turn is at least as abstract as the letters. The 
letters are abstract line-shape types. So the work is at least as abstract as line-
shape types. Line-shape types, like any type, may be instantiated. To write A 
 Yagisawa writes that 
                                                 
236 Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics, p. 64 
237 Yagisawa, ‘Against Creationism in Fiction’, p. 168 
86 
 
Study in Scarlet is to produce an instance of the sequence of the line-shape types 
that is the story without copying another such instance.238
 
 
Goodman and Elgin make a similar claim to Yagisawa, by arguing that identity 
of a text is a purely syntactic matter, and not related to what the text says or 
means or refers to.239 Furthermore, they argue that works are identical to texts. 
On Goodman and Elgin’s interpretation, Pierre Menard (in Borges’s case) has 
not created a work at all. He has merely produced a replica of Cervantes’s text 
without copying it, and given us a new way of interpreting the work (‘as a 
contemporary story in an archaic style with a different plot’).240 Neither of these 
achievements, according to Goodman and Elgin, counts as creating a new work. 
Menard’s writings are just another instance of Cervantes’s text, along with every 
copy ever printed of it. Even an inscription identical to Don Quixote but 
produced randomly would count as an instance of Cervantes’s text (work).241
 
 
Unlike on artefactualist views, the intentions of the author play no part in 
individuating works on this view. It is even possible for texts (and therefore 
works) to be produced by machines that do not understand what they are writing. 
Works produced in this way will still have all of the same interpretations as they 
would have if they were consciously written by authors. 
There are problems for this view. One of these is that it makes it hard to see how 
a translation of a work can be an instance of the same work of fiction. Certainly a 
translation of a fiction will be comprised of a vastly different sequence of line-
                                                 
238 ibid., pp. 167-168 
239 Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin, ‘Interpretation and Identity: Can the Work Survive 
the World?’ in Goodman and Elgin, Reconceptions in Philosophy & Other Arts & Sciences 
(Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988), p. 58 




shape types, but it still seems that it is the same work. This point is disputed by 
Goodman and Elgin. They agree that translations would be a problem for this 
claim if the translation of a work was identical to the original work.242
Obviously no translation retains all that is significant in the original. Even if the 
two are coextensive, reporting exactly the same events in as closely as possible 
the same way, they will somewhat differ in meaning…Indeed, the translator of a 
poem typically has to decide the relative importance of preserving denotation 
(what the poem says), exemplification (what rhythmic, melodic, and other 
formal properties it shows forth), and expression (what feelings and other 
metaphorical properties it conveys).
 However, 




It has been argued that this claim works against the view that Goodman and 
Elgin themselves propose. They claim that texts are individuated solely by their 
spelling, so that ‘The cape is beautiful’ is just one text even if it is used at 
different times to refer to an item of clothing and a geographical feature. 
However, if Goodman and Elgin accept cases like this, where a single text (on 
their account) can have a radically different meaning, then there seems to be no 




A further (and more serious) problem for the view that fictions are sequences of 
line-shape types is that works of fiction have meanings, and in fact have these 
meanings essentially. Sequences of line-shape types (pure sequences) do not 
have meanings at all – they are merely squiggles. Even if it can be argued that 
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such sequences do have meanings, it seems that they have them inessentially. It 
is an accidental fact that some sequence of line-shape types produces sentences 
about the doings of a detective in Victorian London. It is not an accidental fact 
about A Study in Scarlet that it is about the doings of a detective in Victorian 
London. If it were not about this, it would be a different work of fiction. Because 
of this, the sequence of the line-shape types is not identical to the work of fiction 
which is A Study in Scarlet. 
 
A reason that works of fiction cannot be types is that works of fiction are 
modally flexible. Something is modally flexible if it (the very same thing) could 
have been different. This seems to apply to fictions. We have the intuition that 
works of fiction could have been different than they are. For instance, as 
Rohrbaugh writes, ‘Proust’s A La Recherche du Temps Perdu could have been 
longer, shorter, or contained somewhat different sentences than it in fact does.’245
 
 
This is a possibility for that very fiction, and not the possibility that there could 
have been a different fiction with the same name. This does not conflict with the 
claim that works of fiction have certain meanings essentially. The fact that (to go 
back to the previous example) A Study in Scarlet has certain meaning properties 
essentially does not preclude the possibility of its having some different words. It 
may suggest that the modal flexibility of works of fiction is not limitless, but, 
given that we do not ordinarily suppose that it is, this does not create a problem 
for the artefactualist view. 
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The claim that works of fiction are modally flexible has been argued against by 
Currie, who writes that:  
What is partly constitutive of a given work is its pattern or structure. No theory 
of art works that made the structure extrinsic or incidental to that work could 
hope for acceptance. It is not just an accidental fact about Emma that it contains 
that particular word sequence.246
However, this could be seen to be trading on an ambiguity in the word ‘accident’. 
As Rohrbaugh notes, it is no accident that Emma contains exactly that word 
sequence, ‘but this is not a sense of ‘accident’ which contrasts with ‘modally 
necessary’, but with ‘deliberate’’.
 
247 He argues that Jane Austen did deliberately 
(not accidentally) produce a particular sequence of words, but this does not show 
that it is necessary that Emma contains exactly that sequence. The modal 
flexibility of works of fiction also implies (possibly this is the same point) that 
work and text cannot be identical. As Currie notes, if work and text are identical, 
then, by familiar arguments, they are necessarily identical.248
 
 Because we think 
that works could have had different texts, the necessity of identity shows that 
work is not identical to text (though, as just noted, Currie does not believe that 
works actually are modally flexible). 
Rohrbaugh also claims that works of fiction are temporally flexible.249
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that this is an example of a work of fiction changing. It is perhaps more plausible 
to think that the later editions were correct all along (that is, they contained the 
text that should have been contained in any copy of the work), and that the earlier 
editions were in error. The work thus need not change. There are, though, cases 
where an author revises a work after it has been published. These cases can be 
seen in either of two ways. They are either cases where a single work changes 
some of its properties, or cases where a new (but very similar) work is created. 
There seems to be no strong intuitions to pull us one way or the other on this case 
(which itself makes the temporal flexibility of works of fiction seem more 
plausible than the similar claim about works of music). 
 
If works of fiction are not types, then copies of the work do not stand to the work 
in a type/token relationship. As in the case of music, this fact makes it difficult 
for anyone who claims that works of fiction are individuals to account for their 
repeatability, and for the fact that different concrete objects (books) can be 
copies of the same work. Instead of being tokens of the work, books should be 
seen as occurrences of it.250 In other kinds of art, occurrences are a subclass of 
the ‘embodiments’ of a work, where embodiments are the concrete objects on 
which the work ontologically depends for its nature and continued existence. 251
                                                 
250 ibid., p. 198 
 
In the case of works of fiction, it is not clear that there are any embodiments that 
should not count as copies. The relationship between an original manuscript and 
251 Rohrbaugh actually claims that embodiments are the things a work depends on for its 
continued existence. This isn’t quite true. Works of fiction (for instance) also rely on people for 
their continued existence, but I am not an embodiment of any work of fiction. Maybe my Gorky 
Park-related thoughts should count as embodiments of Gorky Park, though even this seems to be 
a stretch. Because of this, I prefer to say that embodiments do not just determine that the work 




a later printed copy of a work seems different than that between a score and a 
performance of a work of music. A manuscript is more like a blueprint than a set 
of instructions, and, unlike a score, is an occurrence of the work. This does not 
mean that the repeatability of works of fiction requires a different explanation 
than that of works of music. The ‘occurrence of’ relation between the work and 
the things which give us access to the work (generally books) will be similar in 
each case. What is different about works of fiction is that all embodiments could 
count as occurrences. Perhaps a film version of a novel would count as an 
embodiment, but not an occurrence, of the work of fiction. I don’t have any real 
intuitions on whether The Lord of the Rings ontologically depends in any way on 
the movies based on the book, but I do think that if all traces of the books 
disappeared then the work would have disappeared even if the films remained. 
There seems to be more to a work of fiction (language, or style, perhaps) than 
can be shown in a film. To read an occurrence of a work of fiction (a copy) 
counts as reading the work. Because copies of the work are embodiments of the 
(abstract) work, in reading them we have access to the entire work, and can find 
out what the work is like. This gives artefactualism an advantage over views 
which claim that a work of fiction is the set of (or the fusion of) copies of the 
work, as this would mean that we could not access the whole of the work without 










This thesis has given evidence for the claim that works of art are artefacts by 
discussing two controversial cases of kinds of art works (works of music and 
works of fiction), as well as fictional characters, and arguing that all three are 
artefacts. If these difficult cases are examples of artefacts, then easier cases (such 
as paintings) will be able to be shown to be artefacts as well. However, the 
arguments of this thesis do not have a claim to completeness. There are many 
other kinds of repeatable work of art that are not discussed, such as films, 
photographs, pieces of pop or rock music, cast sculptures, dances, and so forth. It 
may be that many of the arguments deployed here will also be useful in 
demonstrating that examples of these paradigmatic kinds of works of art are 
artefacts as well. 
 
 There are three theses distinct to artefactualism about works of art. First, works 
of art exist. Second, works of art are created. Third, works of art are individuals. 
It has been argued that each of these claims applies to fictional characters, and 
once we see why and how this is so, we can also see why and how they apply to 
the two kinds of works of art discussed here. The way that we can find out that 
these things are true of fictional characters, works of music, and fictions is by 
examining our critical practices regarding these things. Our critical and 
interpretive practices are primary: metaphysics should be guided by our critical 
practices. Our practices assume the existence of fictional characters, works of 
music, and works of fiction: we refer to such things and quantify over them. We 
also treat them as created, not as discovered or selected, and creationism about 
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these things allows us to individuate them in the appropriate way. Fictional 
characters and works of art are not properties or kinds or any other way that 
things are, but individuals in their own right. 
 
It has been shown that eliminativist, reductionist, and fictionalist views about 
fictional characters, works of music, and works of fiction fail to meet our beliefs 
regarding the existence of these things and what they are like. Platonist views fail 
to account for the creation of fictional characters and of works of art. At least in 
the case of fictional characters, Platonist views also cannot differentiate them 
from other kinds of thing. These views also do not allow us to treat works of art 
as modally flexible, and require us to think of works of art as property-like, 
rather than as particular individuals.  
 
The most difficult problems for the artefactualist view are to explain how 
abstracta can be created and how individuals can have multiple occurrences. In 
the first case, they are created by whatever actions enable us (in the first place) to 
talk about them. These actions are also the actions that bring it about that there 
are things that can be truly said about what the character or the work is like. Our 
ability to truly say things about fictional characters and works of art begins when 
they become publicly accessible, through publication or public performance or 
some other means. Solving the second problem requires us to explain the fact 
that we can have (for instance) different performances of the same work of music 
without appealing to a type/token relationship. This is a problem which does not 
apply to fictional characters, so solving it requires an extension of the view of 
fictional characters defended here. The challenge can be met by appealing to the 
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notion of embodiment: occurrences (performances of a work of music or copies 
of a work of fiction) are those embodiments of the work (physical objects on 
which a work depends) that present us with those features of the work which are 
salient to criticism. Furthermore, if we are to regard our practices regarding 
works as primary, and our practices treat works as repeatable, then it must be the 
case that works are repeatable. 
 
Let me finish with a speculation. Artefactualism is a theory that may in fact be 
worth examining with regards to many cultural (or even theoretical) objects 
outside of art. Most clearly, works of non-fiction seem to have the same relevant 
properties as works of fiction, and to thus be artefacts as well. Words seem to be 
an example of created abstracta, and propositions, sentences, and theories may all 
be such that their nature is determined by our practices of using them, and those 
practices imply that they are existent, created (and thus at least initially mind 
dependent), individual objects. Properties could also be relevantly similar as 
regards their means of creation: they may just come along with our practices of 
talking about properties. Possible worlds may turn out to be artefacts that are 
created by philosophers using a certain theory. It is hard to know without further 
research exactly how far artefactualism in metaphysics can be pushed. There 
seem to be reasons that are not applicable to fictional characters or works of art 
for treating such things as possible worlds and properties as eternal or necessary 
existents. Numbers would seem to be a case where it is highly questionable 
whether they could be created or whether they would still exist without us. 
However, it is highly likely that the conclusions drawn here about works of art 
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